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INTRODUCTION 
“[W]e can put Americans to work today building the infrastructure 
of tomorrow.  From the first railroads to the interstate highway sys-
tem, our nation has always been built to compete.”1 
“Our infrastructure used to be the best, but our lead has slipped . . . .  
[W]hen our own engineers graded our nation’s infrastructure, they 
gave us a ‘D.’”2 
President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Addresses in 2010 
and 2011 focused on the need to rebuild trade-related infrastructure 
as an aspect of revitalizing the United States’ economic condition.3  
American seaports are a central component of the President’s discus-
sion.4  Port5-related activities contribute more than $649 billion an-
nually to the U.S. Gross Domestic Product, sustain more than thir-
teen million jobs, and contribute over $212 billion annually in federal, 
state, and local taxes.6  United States seaports—much like the rest of 
the United States’ infrastructure—are in desperate need of improve-
ment.7  Federal, state, and industry actors agree that freight rail and 
 
*
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 1. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010). 
 2. President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) (refe-
rencing AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, 2009 REPORT CARD FOR AMERI-
CA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2009), available at http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org 
/sites/default/files/RC2009_full_report.pdf (assigning U.S. inland waterways a grade 
of D-, U.S. roads a grade of D-, U.S. rail a grade of C-, and U.S. bridges a grade of 
C)). 
 3. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011); 
President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010). 
 4. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011) 
(“To help businesses sell more products abroad, we set a goal of doubling our exports 
by 2014–because the more we export, the more jobs we create here at home.”); see 
also Marine Transportation System (MTS), U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., MAR. ADMIN., 
http://www.marad.dot.gov/ports_landing_page/marine_transportation_system/MTS.h
tm (last visited July 29, 2011) (estimating that ninety-nine percent of the volume of 
overseas trade enters or leaves the U.S. by ship). 
 5. “Port” is defined as a “geographic term referring to a harbor with piers or 
docks where ships can load and unload cargo.” FED. MAR. COMM’N, 
http://www.fmc.gov/marine_terminal_operators/ (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 6. See Marine Transportation System (MTS), supra note 4. 
 7. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT 13 (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/econ 
omic-policy/Documents/infrastructure_investment_report.pdf (“[The United States] 
spend[s] approximately 2 percent of GDP on infrastructure, a 50 percent decline 
from 1960.  China and Europe, by contrast, spend close to 9 percent and 5 percent of 
GDP on infrastructure, respectively.”); Press Release, Am. Assoc. of Port Auth., 
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roadways servicing seaports require significant repair and expansion.8  
What they cannot agree upon, however, is how to generate the funds 
necessary to meet current and future capacity needs.9 
Modern container ports10 have witnessed a sea change in how glob-
al trade is conducted.11  From 1990 to 2007, trade in containerized 
 
AAPA Port Members Testify on Crumbling Infrastructure (Mar. 17, 2010), available 
at http://www.aapa-ports.org/Press/PRdetail.cfm?itemnumber=17380; AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS, supra note 2; Press Release, John Kerry, Introduction 
of the BUILD Act (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://kerry.senate.gov/press/ 
speeches/speech/?id=5b9c0dc5-9c4d-4aae-b651-64a4f8c10c83 (“[E]xperts say we will 
need to invest $250 billion for each of the next fifty years just to meet our nation’s 
surface transportation needs and it will cost more than $2 trillion to bring our coun-
try’s existing infrastructure to an acceptable level.”). 
 8. See Press Release, John Kerry, supra note 7; see also Bill Mongelluzzo, New 
View on Fees, J. COM., Aug. 18, 2008, at WP [hereinafter Mongelluzzo, New View on 
Fees] (“While the entire U.S. transportation network is in need of repair and expan-
sion, the needs are greatest and more immediate in some regions. Los Angeles and 
Long Beach have not initiated a major infrastructure project in seven years.  Com-
munity groups and local politicians said they would block future expansion unless the 
ports implement fees to fund infrastructure and environmental improvements.”); 
Press Release, Am. Assoc. of Port Auth., supra note 7.  
 9. Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, supra note 8, at 4 (“Proposals at the local, 
state and national levels indicate that user fees are inevitable, and the debate now 
centers on how to structure them and whether a national fee is preferable to a series 
of state and local fees.”); see also Anna Fifield, Obstacles to Progress, FIN. TIMES, 
Aug. 1, 2011, at 5. 
 10. The FMC explains that “most major port facilities in the United States are 
publicly owned and maintained by multi-state, state, county, district or other public 
or quasi-public organizations” that are commonly referred to as “port authorities.” 
FEDERAL MARITIME COMMISSION, http://www.fmc.gov/marine_terminal_operators/ 
(last visited July 29, 2011).  Port authorities are responsible for the overall adminis-
tration of the property, terminals, and other facilities at a public port. Id.  As exam-
ples, the Port of Los Angeles is a department of the City of Los Angeles. See A Pro-
file of the Port of Los Angeles, PORT OF LOS ANGELES, http://www.portof 
losangeles.org/about/profile.asp (last visited July 29, 2011).  The Port of Long Beach 
is an agency operated by the City of Long Beach Harbor Department. See Port of 
Long Beach FAQs, PORT OF LONG BEACH, http://www.polb.com/about/faqs.asp#530 
(last visited July 29, 2011).  The ports of New York and New Jersey are operated by 
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (a quasi-governmental entity 
created through bi-state compact). See Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J. History, PORT 
AUTHORITY OF N.Y. & N.J., http://www.panynj.gov/port/history.html (last visited July 
29, 2011).  The Port of Oakland is operated by an independent Board of Commis-
sioners that is nominated by the Mayor of Oakland and appointed by the City Coun-
cil to staggered four-year terms. See Port of Oakland Commissioners, PORT OF 
OAKLAND, http://www.portofoakland.com/portnyou/portoffi.asp (last visited July 29, 
2011).   
 11. The revolution in containerized trade was recognized with the advent of con-
tainerization in 1956. See Impact of Containerization on Laws Concerning the Mari-
time Shipping Industry, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 417, 417 (1969) (“The maritime shipping 
industry is undergoing a revolution.  The coming of age of containerized ocean ship-
ping is having a profound effect in the United States and throughout the world.”).  
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cargo—i.e., cargo transported in a truck trailer body that can be de-
tached from the frame of the truck for loading into a vessel or rail 
car12—in the United States’ four largest container ports increased as 
follows: Ports of New York and New Jersey (279%), Port of Los An-
geles (395%), Port of Long Beach (456%), and Port of Savannah 
(621%).13  Driven by the surging market in containerized trade, the 
size of ships calling on U.S. ports has grown from 4500 twenty-foot 
equivalent units (“TEUs”)14 to 12,000 TEUs,15 which has increased 
the number of trucks and miles of freight rail necessary to transport 
cargo from seaports to interior manufacturing and distribution 
points.16  Consequently, many roadways have become inadequate,17 
 
On April 26, 1956, the IDEAL X sailed as the first modern containership carrying 
fifty-eight truck trailers (without chassis). See Marva Jo Wyatt, Ports, Politicians and 
the Public Trust: The Los Angeles Port Funds Controversy Comes Face to Face with 
Federal Law, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 357, 357 n.3 (1996); John Davies, 40 Years Later, 
Boxes Rule, J. COM., Apr. 26, 1996, at 1C-2C.  In 1958, the Hawaiian Merchant car-
ried twenty containers from the Port of Los Angeles, which was the first time con-
tainers were used in Pacific trade.  See Erich E. Toll, Ports Reinvented Themselves to 
Provide Box Infrastructure, J. COM., Apr. 26, 1996, at 5C.  The Federal Maritime 
Administration estimates that over forty-five million TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent 
units) and 1.5 billion tons of foreign traffic were handled in 2006, with a value of 
nearly 1.3 trillion dollars. See Marine Transportation System (MTS), supra note 4. 
 12. Mar. Admin., Glossary of Shipping Terms, U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., MAR. ADMIN. 
32 (2008), http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Glossary_final.pdf [hereinafter 
Glossary of Shipping Terms].  A container may be 20 feet, 40 feet, 45 feet, 48 feet or 
53 feet in length, 8’0” or 8’6” in width, and 8’6” or 9’6” in height. See id.  Containe-
rized cargo is different than “bulk” cargo, which is unpackaged commodity cargo 
(e.g., oil, grain, coal, etc.). See id. at 22.  Break-bulk cargo is loaded individually (e.g., 
boxes, drums, crates, barrels, etc.). See id. at 21. 
 13. See AM. ASSOC. OF PORT AUTH., NORTH AMERICA: CONTAINER PORT TRAF-
FIC IN TEUS, http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/Statistics/CONTAINER%20TRAFFIC 
%20NORTH%20AMERICA%201990%20-%202009.xls (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 14. TEU relates to the size of the container used to transport goods. See PORT OF 
LONG BEACH, http://www.polb.com/economics/stats/latest_teus.asp (last visited July 
29, 2011).  A TEU is the size of the container that is generally hauled by an eighteen-
wheel truck. 
 15. See Kevin Cullinane & Mahim Khanna, Economies of Scale in Large Con-
tainer Ships, 33 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 185, 185 (1999) (stating that container 
ships in 1984 could hold 4500 TEUs); cf. Bill Mongelluzzo, Is the West Coast Canal-
Resistant?, J. COM., Oct. 18, 2010, at WP [hereinafter Mongelluzzo, Is the West Coast 
Canal-Resistant?] (“The widening of the Panama Canal, expected to be complete in 
2014, will allow passage of vessels up to 12,000 TEUs, double the size of today’s Pa-
nam[a] ships . . . .”).  
 16. See Mongelluzzo, Is the West Coast Canal-Resistant?, supra note 15; see also 
Jones Lang LaSalle, Port, Airport and Global Infrastructure Outlook, ON POINT, 
Summer 2010, 6, available at http://www.us.am.joneslanglasalle.com/ResearchLevel1/ 
US_PAGI_Report_Summer_2010_v2_JLL.pdf. 
 17. See Fifield, supra note 9 (“The number of miles travelled by cars and trucks 
has doubled in the past 25 years, but highway lane miles have increased by only 4.4 
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resulting in roadway congestion,18 increased fuel emissions,19 and re-
lated environmental and public health concerns.20 
Additionally, East Coast ports are uniquely concerned with port-
related capacity and infrastructure issues.21  Historically, the largest 
ships transporting containerized cargo have been unable to pass 
through the Panama Canal in calling on East Coast ports.22  This is 
about to change.  The Panama Canal is currently being expanded to 
accommodate ships carrying up to 12,000 TEUs.23  The anticipated 
completion of the Panama Canal Expansion Project in 2014 has 
forced ports on the eastern seaboard to dredge channels deeper to ac-
 
per cent.”); Peter T. Leach, Blocking that Diversion: Taking a Discretionary View, 
the Latest New York-New Jersey Port Budget Includes Significant Infrastructure In-
vestment, J. COM., Dec. 20, 2010 [hereinafter Leach, Blocking that Diversion] (stating 
that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey is very close to roadway fail-
ures in port areas); Mongelluzzo, Is the West Coast Canal-Resistant?, supra note 15 
(“Inadequate capacity and congestion at terminal gates and road and rail connectors 
are limitations all ports must contend with as cargo volume increases in the years 
ahead.  The biggest short-term loss of market share at a U.S. port complex came after 
Los Angeles-Long Beach experienced crippling congestion problems in 2004 . . . .”). 
 18. See Mark Bernstein, The More Trade Grows, the Worse U.S. Port Congestion 
Becomes, WORLD TRADE, Aug. 1, 2006, available at http://www.worldtradewt100 
.com/articles/the-more-trade-grows-the-worse-u-s-port-congestion-becomes; Mongel-
luzzo, Is the West Coast Canal-Resistant?, supra note 15. 
 19. See generally COALITION FOR HEALTHY PORTS, HAZARDOUS TO OUR 
HEALTH: THE HUMAN IMPACT OF PORT TRUCK POLLUTION ON TRUCK DRIVERS AND 
RESIDENTS OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY (2009); L. BRUCE HILL, CLEAN AIR 
TASK FORCE, THE CARBON DIOXIDE-EQUIVALENT BENEFITS OF REDUCING BLACK 
CARBON EMISSIONS FROM U.S. CLASS 8 TRUCKS USING DIESEL PARTICULATE FIL-
TERS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS (2009); NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
HARBORING POLLUTION: THE DIRTY TRUTH ABOUT AMERICA’S PORTS (2004). 
 20. See NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, supra note 19, at 9-10.   
 21. See Jones Lang LaSalle, supra note 16, at 6. 
 22. See Bill Armbruster, Game Changer: Expansion of the Panama Canal Will 
Reshape Global Trade Patterns, CARGO BUS. NEWS, http://www.cargobusinessnews. 
com/Feb10/portcomm_game_changer.html (last visited July 29, 2011) (“Two new sets 
of locks—one on the Pacific side, the other on the Atlantic side—will be able to ac-
commodate 12,000-TEU ships.  That’s more than twice the current maximum capaci-
ty of 5,000 TEUs.”); Joseph Bonney, MSC Puts 8,085 TEU Ships Into East Coast, J. 
COM., Feb. 19, 2010, http://www.joc.com/maritime/msc-puts-8085-teu-ships-east-coast 
(“U.S. East Coast ports . . . have been rushing to prepare for the larger ships that will 
be able to transit the Panama Canal after 2014 when a multibillion-dollar lock-
expansion project is completed.”).  The only way for ships larger than 5000 TEUs to 
arrive at East Coast ports is to travel around South America. 
 23. See PANAMA CANAL AUTH., PROPOSAL FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE PANAMA 
CANAL: THIRD SET OF LOCKS PROJECT 44 (2006), http://www.pancanal.com/ 
eng/plan/documentos/propuesta/acp-expansion-proposal.pdf. See generally PANAMA 
CANAL AUTH., PANAMA CANAL EXPANSION PROGRAM (2011), http://www.pancanal. 
com/eng/expansion/informes-de-avance/components/components-2011.pdf. 
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commodate the larger ships24 and expand intermodal facilities25 to 
transport containerized cargo quicker and more efficiently.26 
Containerized cargo is here to stay, but what is less certain is how 
the United States will fund new infrastructure and development to 
accommodate its proliferation within the shipping industry.27  In re-
cent years, members of Congress have proposed legislation to fund 
infrastructure and development at U.S. seaports.28  Three of these 
proposals create a fund based on a tax or fee assessed on the value of 
goods entering or leaving the United States.29  A separate proposal 
concerns the creation of an infrastructure bank that, with an initial 
government contribution of $10 billion, would “leverage private-
public partnerships and maximize private funding” to fund infrastruc-
ture and development projects.30  Two of these proposals died in 
committee during the 111th Congress,31 and the other two have been 
reintroduced in the 112th Congress after failing to be enacted in pre-
vious legislative sessions.32 
 
 24. See Peter T. Leach, Locked in for Growth, J. COM., Feb. 1, 2010, 
http://www.joc.com/maritime/locked-growth [hereinafter Leach, Locked in for 
Growth]. 
 25. See H.R. REP. NO. 98–53 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 167, 168.  
Congress has directly addressed the need to encourage “intermodalism” at U.S. sea-
ports, which Congress has historically defined as “when a container moves between 
shipper and consignee under a single intermodal tariff.” Id. at 177.  The term “inter-
modalism” refers to the movement of goods by ship, rail, and/or truck from origin to 
destination. Id. at 177–78; see also Glossary of Shipping Terms, supra note 12, at 57 
(providing that “intermodal” is “[u]sed to denote movements of cargo containers in-
terchangeably between transport modes, i.e., motor, rail, water, and air carriers, and 
where the equipment is compatible within the multiple systems”). 
 26. See Leach, Locked in for Growth, supra note 24; Jones Lang LaSalle, supra 
note 16, at 6 (“As trucking costs increase due to volatile gas pricing, tolls or other 
road usage fees, there will be a continued push toward freight rail.  This will help 
curb congestion on the nation’s roadways, offset auto-related emissions and could 
potentially drive more cargo to interior, regional distribution hubs.  Rail produces 
forty to sixty percent fewer greenhouse gas emissions than trucks.  Additionally, 
freight costs on rail are much lower, approximately one-third the cost of trucking.”). 
 27. See Jones Lang LaSalle, supra note 16, at 8; Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, 
supra note 8; see infra Part II (discussing congressional and local proposals to remedy 
infrastructure funding needs). 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
 29. See ON TIME Act, H.R. 526, 112th Cong. (2011); MOVEMENT Act of 2009, 
H.R. 2355, 111th Cong. (2009); National Freight Mobility Infrastructure Fund, H.R. 
2702, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 30. Building and Upgrading Infrastructure for Long-Term Development Act, S. 
652, 112th Cong. (2011); Press Release, John Kerry, supra note 7; see infra Part II.B. 
 31. H.R. 2355 and H.R. 2702. 
 32. See H.R. 526; S. 652; see also infra Part II.A, II.B.  The concept for an infra-
structure bank was originally introduced by Senator Chris Dodd and former Senator 
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The hands of local port authorities, however, are tied by constitu-
tional and statutory constraints, rather than a lack of consensus.33  
Port authorities generate revenues through the management of port 
facilities.34  The ability of port authorities to assess taxes on shippers 
“for the privilege of entering, or trading, or lying in a port or har-
bor”35 is precluded by the United States Supreme Court’s interpreta-
tion of the Constitution’s Tonnage Clause.36  The Court has, however, 
recognized a State’s ability to assess a charge on shippers for actual 
use of port facilities that is fairly apportioned to “opportunities, bene-
fits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing [authority].”37  
Congress placed additional constraints on state regulatory authority 
with the passage of the Shipping Act.38  The Shipping Act provides 
that port authorities cannot “fail to establish, observe, and enforce 
just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to or connected 
with receiving, handling, storing, or delivering property [at ports]”39 
or impose “any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage 
with respect to any person.”40  Courts and the Federal Maritime 
Commission (“FMC”) have interpreted this as requiring any fee im-
posed on a shipper, trucker, marine terminal operator,41 or beneficial 
 
Chuck Hagel as the National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, S. 1926, 110th Cong. 
(2007). 
 33. See infra Part I. 
 34. See generally PORT OF L.A., FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, http://www.portoflos 
angeles.org/finance/financial_statements.asp (last visited July 29, 2011); PORT OF 
LONG BEACH, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, http://www.polb.com/finance/financial 
statements.asp (last visited July 29, 2011); PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., FINANCIAL 
STATEMENTS, http://www.panynj.gov/corporate-information/financial-statements. 
html (last visited July 29 2011). 
 35. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 696 (1883). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 37. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2281 (2009) (quoting Ott v. Mis-
sissippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949)).  
 38. See 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101–44106 (West 2006). 
 39. Id. § 41102. 
 40. Id. § 41106.   
 41. The term “marine terminal operator” means “a person engaged in the United 
States in the business of providing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal fa-
cilities in connection with a common carrier.”  Id. § 40102(14).  “A ‘common carrier’ 
is a person that (i) holds itself out to the general public to provide transportation by 
water of passengers or cargo between the United States and a foreign country for 
compensation; (ii) assumes responsibility for the transportation from the port or 
point of receipt to the port or point of destination; and (iii) uses, for all or part of that 
transportation, a vessel operating on the high seas or the Great Lakes between a port 
in the United States and a port in a foreign country.” Id. § 40102(6). 
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cargo owner42 (collectively “Port Users”) to generate actual benefits 
to the user on a reasonably equivalent basis.43  The problem with this 
fee structure is that it limits the ability of port authorities to assess a 
fee for the construction and development of large-scale, port-related 
infrastructure and development projects44—the benefits of which 
would accrue to both those paying and not paying the fee, or the costs 
of which would be incurred by those not enjoying the benefit. 
As this Note will discuss, the largest port authorities have proposed 
or implemented such a fee.45  These fees are to be assessed on cargo 
entering or leaving the port and allocated to meet new and existing 
infrastructure and development needs.46  The fees are also viewed as 
necessary revenue generating mechanisms to meet new security man-
dates adopted by Congress in the wake of September 11, 200147 and 
 
 42. “Beneficial Cargo Owner” refers to the importer of record, who physically 
takes possession of a cargo at the destination and does not act as a third party in the 
movement of such goods. Glossary of Shipping Terms, supra note 12, at 16. 
 43. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 390 U.S. 261, 282 
(1968); see also infra Part I.B, I.C. 
 44. See generally Volkswagenwerk, 390 U.S. 261; Plaquemines Port, Harbor & 
Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Baton Rouge 
Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 655 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Car-
gill v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 530 F.2d 1062, 1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Flanagan Ship-
ping Corp. v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 27 S.R.R. 1123 (F.M.C. 1997); 
Port of Ponce v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 25 S.R.R. 883 (F.M.C. 1990); Gulf Con-
tainer Line v. Port of Houston Auth., 25 S.R.R. 1141 (F.M.C. 1990); Louis Dreyfus 
Corp. v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 21 S.R.R. 219 (F.M.C. 1981); 
West Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. Port of Houston Auth., 18 S.R.R. 783 (F.M.C. 1978). 
 45. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J, FMC Schedule No. PA 10, Section H, Subrule 
34 (Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://www.panynj.gov/corporate-information/ 
pdf/tariffs-rr-port-authority-ny-nj--0210.pdf [hereinafter Section H, Subrule 34]; Port 
of Los Angeles, Tariff No. 4, Section 21 (Aug. 2, 2010), available at 
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/finance/tariff_4.asp [hereinafter Tariff No. 4, Section 
21]; see infra Part II.D for a more detailed discussion.  
 46. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey implemented a charge as-
sessed on all cargo—container, vehicle, bulk, and break bulk—entering or leaving 
the ports of New York and New Jersey.  Section H, Subrule 34, supra note 45.  The 
Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach have proposed a similar charge that will 
be assessed only on containerized cargo.  Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 45. 
 47. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON 
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE, MARITIME SECURITY: 
NATIONAL STRATEGY AND SUPPORTING PLANS WERE GENERALLY WELL-
DEVELOPED AND ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED 18 (2008) (“The national strategy ad-
dresses investments and risk management in a general way . . . but the strategy does 
not contain an investment strategy for implementing this strategic action nor does it 
determine how costs will be borne among the involved parties . . . . Without guidance 
on resources, investments, and risk management, implementing parties may find it 
difficult to allocate resources and investments according to priorities and constraints, 
track costs and performance, and shift investments and resources as appropriate.”).  
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environmental initiatives designed to reduce the environmental im-
pacts of port operations.48  Shipping lines, however, have challenged 
the validity of port authority fees assessed for port-related freight rail 
and roadway improvement projects before the FMC.49  Whether these 
fees can or will withstand scrutiny under the Tonnage Clause or Ship-
ping Act has yet to be determined. 
Given the lack of consensus and certainty in how funding should 
best be generated to meet critical infrastructure and development 
needs, this Note proposes an amendment to the Shipping Act to pro-
vide port authorities with the express power to impose fees for the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of qualifying port-related 
infrastructure and development initiatives.50  The amendment would 
effectively spread the costs specific to qualifying initiatives over the 
useful life of the project.  The U.S. Department of Transportation 
would first be required to approve any project qualifying for funding 
under the amendment. 
 
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress committed $8 billion to airport secu-
rity, but promised seaports only $350 million of the more than $6 billion the Coast 
Guard estimated would be needed over the following ten year period. See Daniel 
Machalaba, Safe Harbors? About 12 Million Containers Enter U.S. Ports Annually; 
Only 4% Get Security Checks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 2003, at B1.  As reported in 
2003, only four percent of the twelve million containers entering the United States 
were x-rayed or visually inspected. Id.; see also Deborah Schoch, Port Security Up-
grades Welcomed, but Industry Asks Who Will Pay, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at 
Desk 3.  
 48. See Environmental Initiatives at the Port of New York and New Jersey, PORT 
AUTHORITY OF N.Y. & N.J., http://www.panynj.gov/about/port-initiatives.html (last 
visited July 29, 2011); Port of Los Angeles Environmental Mitigation, 
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/environment/mitiga 
tion.asp (last visited July 29, 2011); see also NATURAL RESOURCE DEFENSE COUNCIL, 
supra note 19, at 1 (“The diesel engines at ports, which power ships, trucks, trains, 
and cargo-handling equipment, create vast amounts of air pollution that affect the 
health of workers and people living in nearby communities and contribute significant-
ly to regional air pollution.”); EPA Submits Proposal to Reduce Shipping Pollution 
at U.S. Ports, 39 NATION’S HEALTH 9 (2009).   
 49. On August 5, 2011, nine shipping lines filed a Complaint for Cease and Desist 
Order and Reparations against the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey al-
leging that its charge on all cargo entering the ports of New York and New Jersey to 
fund general infrastructure and development projects is a violation of the Shipping 
Act’s prohibition on unreasonable and discriminatory practices.  See Complaint for 
Cease and Desist Order and Reparations, China Shipping Container Lines Co. v. 
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (F.M.C. Aug. 5, 2011), at V; see 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 41102(c), 
41106 (West 2006); infra Part I.B, II.D; see also infra note 287 (discussing the signi-
ficance of this litigation to the proposal outlined in this Note). 
 50. See infra Part III. 
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Shippers vehemently oppose a congressional green light for port 
authorities to assess fees for general improvements,51 but shippers al-
so recognize that there is a significant problem arising out of increa-
singly modernized and automated shipping operations and the United 
States’ currently outdated and outmoded port infrastructure.52  A 
carefully crafted amendment to the Shipping Act can provide the 
shipping industry with reasonable assurances that a new fee will be 
accompanied by a proportionate benefit.53 
Part I discusses the relevant provisions and judicial standards asso-
ciated with the Tonnage Clause and Shipping Act.  Part II addresses 
the efforts by both Congress and port authorities to generate funding 
for port-related infrastructure and development initiatives.  Part III 
proposes a legislative amendment to the Shipping Act that provides 
port authorities with the express power to impose fees on cargo over 
a reasonable investment horizon for qualifying infrastructure and de-
velopment projects.  This amendment would ensure that port authori-
ties are best able to meet pressing infrastructure and development 
needs. 
I.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON PORT 
OPERATIONS 
The ability of port authorities to assess charges on Port Users is 
governed primarily by the Tonnage Clause of the Constitution and 
the federal Shipping Act.  Part I first discusses the application of rele-
vant constitutional and statutory provisions, and then illustrates the 
courts’ more exacting standard in evaluating the validity of a fee as-
sessed upon a Port User by a port authority under the Shipping Act.  
As discussed below, the Shipping Act significantly restrains port au-
thorities’ ability to generate funds for general port-related infrastruc-
ture and development projects. 
 
 51. See Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, supra note 8.  
 52. See Bill Mongelluzzo, Fees, Fees and More Fees; LA, Long Beach Will Add a 
Per-Container Fee on Loaded Boxes Moving Through the Ports, J. COM., Jan. 21, 
2008, at 24 [hereinafter Mongelluzzo, Fees, Fees and More Fees] (“Many shippers 
accept the ‘user pays’ concept of container fees to help finance needed roadway, 
bridge and rail corridor projects.  But they aren’t willing to carry the load for free 
riders.”); Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, supra note 8, at 2 (“Shippers and carriers 
have come to view user fees with a certain amount of resignation, and as the most 
practical and expeditious approach to repairing and expanding a national freight 
transportation infrastructure network that all agree is inadequate.”). 
 53. See infra Part III. 
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A. The Tonnage Clause 
The Tonnage Clause of the Constitution provides that “[n]o State 
shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage.”54  It 
is intended to safeguard the Constitution’s general prohibition against 
states laying duties on imports or exports55 by preventing states from 
imposing duties on the ships transporting goods in commerce.56  Con-
gress may, however, grant exceptions to this general prohibition.57 
A “Duty of Tonnage” is a tax assessed by a state actor on a vessel 
solely for the privilege of entering, remaining in, or departing from a 
port.58  Critical to the Supreme Court’s analysis of what constitutes an 
impermissible duty of tonnage is the distinction between a tax and a 
user fee.59  For example, in Cannon v. City of New Orleans,60 the City 
of New Orleans imposed a charge on any vessel landing on the river-
bank, regardless of whether the vessel was utilizing a city-constructed 
wharf.61  The Supreme Court held that the charge violated the Ton-
nage Clause: 
[T]he dues here claimed cannot be supported as a compensation for 
the use of the city’s wharves, but that it is a tax upon every vessel 
which stops, either by landing or mooring, in the waters of the Mis-
 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.  
 55. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be ab-
solutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Du-
ties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the 
Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision 
and Controul of the Congress.”). 
 56. See Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577, 583 (1874). 
 57. See id. (“If hardships arise in the enforcement of this principle, and the just 
necessities of a local commerce require a tax which is otherwise forbidden, it is pre-
sumed that Congress would not withhold its assent if properly informed and its con-
sent requested.”). 
 58. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935); Packet Co. v. Keo-
kuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877); Cannon, 87 U.S. at 577; Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Termin-
al Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Captain Andy’s Sailing, 
Inc. v. Johns, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (D. Haw. 2001). 
 59. See Erik M. Jensen, Quirky Constitutional Provisions Matter: The Tonnage 
Clause, Polar Tankers, and State Taxation of Commerce, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
669, 703 (2011) (“One reason the user fee-tax distinction does not appear in the 
founding debates is that the founders, when discussing taxation, were not talking 
about charges for specific benefits.”). 
 60. 87 U.S. 577. 
 61. See id. at 577. 
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sissippi River within the city of New Orleans, for the privilege of so 
landing or mooring.62 
In other words, the charge could not be attributed to any identifia-
ble benefit provided by the state to the vessel and was, therefore, an 
impermissible duty of tonnage. 
The Supreme Court recognized the ability of states to charge ship 
owners for “services rendered or for conveniences provided.”63  Put 
another way, if a state actor improved a port facility, such as through 
the construction of a wharf64 or by providing pilotage or towage ser-
vices,65 and ship owners availed themselves of those improvements, 
then the state could charge a reasonable fee for the use of that im-
 
 62. Id. at 581; see also Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238 (1876) (hold-
ing that the substance of the tax rather than its name is critical in determining that a 
fee imposed on ships based on their tonnage was unconstitutional); In re State Ton-
nage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204 (1870) (holding that an Alabama tax levied on 
ships at the rate of one dollar per ton violated the Tonnage Clause, since it reflected a 
duty on the ship for the privilege of using Alabama’s ports); Bridgeport & Port Jef-
ferson Steamboat Co. v. Bridgeport Port Auth., 566 F. Supp. 2d 81, 102 (D. Conn. 
2008), aff’d, 567 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that “[t]he Passenger Fee imposed by 
the Port Authority is used for the impermissible purpose of raising general revenues 
and for projects which do not and could not benefit the ferry passengers . . . .  Instead, 
a significant portion of the Passenger Fee funds projects completely unrelated and 
unavailable to the fee payers, such as negotiations, legal fees, and [various] develop-
ment proposals.”).  Most recently, the Supreme Court invalidated a tax imposed by 
the City of Valdez on certain vessels using city ports as a violation of the Tonnage 
Clause.  See Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277 (2009).  For a more 
detailed discussion of the Court’s ruling in Polar Tankers, see Jensen, supra note 59; 
Taylor Simpson-Wood, Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska: A New Spin on 
the Tonnage Clause Leaves Lower Courts and Government Taxing Authorities High 
and Dry, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 19 (2010); Angelo J. Suozzi, The Misinterpretation of 
the Tonnage Clause in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 289 
(2009). 
 63. Packet Co., 95 U.S. at 85 (“It is a tax or a duty that is prohibited: something 
imposed by virtue of sovereignty, not claimed as a right of proprietorship.”). 
 64. See id.; Cannon, 87 U.S. at 582.  Wharfage is a “[c]harge assessed by a pier or 
dock owner against freight handled over the pier or dock or against a steamship 
company using the pier or dock.” Glossary of Shipping Terms, supra note 12, at 109. 
 65. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1935).  “Pilotage” 
is defined as “the charge . . . assessed against a vessel . . . for the service rendered or 
proffered of piloting such vessel on entering, leaving, or shifting in [a port].”  Port of 
Los Angeles, Tariff No. 4, Section 3 (Jan. 20, 1997), available at 
http://www.portoflosangeles.org/Tariff/SEC03.pdf.  “Towage” is defined as “the 
charge made for towing a vessel.” Glossary of Shipping Terms, supra note 12, at 101. 
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provement.66  The Court has upheld these charges as reasonable re-
gardless of whether a ship’s tonnage is a basis for the fee calculation.67 
Fees imposed on ship owners for general services have also been 
upheld as reasonable under the Tonnage Clause, regardless of wheth-
er the ship owners availed themselves of those services.  In Clyde 
Mallory Lines v. Alabama,68 the Port of Mobile adopted a schedule of 
harbor fees that included a fee on vessels 500 tons and over to recoup 
the costs of providing policing services to put out fires and implement 
other public safety measures.69  The plaintiff ship owner claimed that 
the fee was unconstitutional under the Tonnage Clause because it was 
imposed on all vessels entering the port, regardless of whether the 
vessel received the benefit of the service.70  In upholding the fee, the 
Court distinguished between fees charged for pilotage and towage 
and fees that inure to the benefit of all port users.71  “[A] charge for a 
service such as the present is neither within the historic meaning of 
the phrase ‘duty of tonnage’ nor the purpose of the constitutional 
prohibition.”72  In other words, a charge for general services actually 
received is not a tax and therefore is not prohibited by the Tonnage 
Clause. 
The Supreme Court has directly addressed the distinction between 
a tax and a user fee, albeit in the context of the Constitution’s Export 
 
 66. See Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 
F.2d 536, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 67. See Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 266; THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENER-
AL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNTIED STATES OF AMERICA 87 
(1880) (“Wharfage dues are not taxes, and they may, therefore, be laid in proportion 
to tonnage.”). 
 68. 296 U.S. 261. 
 69. See id. at 263. 
 70. See id. at 266. 
 71. See id. (“The benefits that flow from the enforcement of regulations, such as 
the present, to protect and facilitate traffic in a busy harbor inure to all who enter 
it.”). 
 72. Id. at 267.  Although it is not addressed in the opinion, courts have extrapo-
lated from the Clyde Mallory decision that the Tonnage Clause does not prohibit a 
fee when non-paying individuals receive the benefit of the general services provided 
by the fee. See, e.g., Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n, 838 F.2d 536, 548 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Captain Andy’s Sailing, Inc. v. 
Johns, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1173 (D. Haw. 2001); see also Barber v. Hawaii, 42 F.3d 
1185, 1196 (9th Cir. 1994).  In Clyde Mallory, this would relate to vessels less than 500 
tons or any other beneficiary of the emergency services. See Jensen, supra note 59, at 
707–08 (arguing that the fee assessed in Clyde Mallory is actually more akin to a tax 
than a user fee); cf. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. Valdez, 129 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2009) (hold-
ing that a tax imposed by the city on large ships which is designed to raise revenue for 
general municipal consumption is a violation of the Tonnage Clause). 
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Clause.73  In United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp.,74 the Supreme Court 
considered arguments on whether the congressionally enacted Har-
bor Maintenance Tax (“HMT”) was a violation of the Export 
Clause’s categorical prohibition against taxes on goods exported from 
any state.75  The HMT assessed a charge equal to 0.125% of the car-
go’s value “at the time of loading for exports and unloading for other 
shipments.”76  Once collected, Congress could use fees to fund quali-
fying harbor maintenance and development projects.77  Understand-
ing the Court’s hard line rule against taxing exports, the Government 
argued that the tax was actually a user fee.78  The Court relied on 
Pace v. Burgess79 in holding the HMT unconstitutional. 
[T]he connection between a service the Government renders and 
the compensation it receives for that service must be closer than 
what is present here . . . .  [T]he HMT is determined entirely on an 
ad valorem basis.  The value of export cargo, however, does not cor-
relate reliably with the federal harbor services used or usable by the 
exporter . . . .  This does not mean that exporters are exempt from 
any and all user fees designed to defray the cost of harbor develop-
ment and maintenance.  It does mean, however, that such a fee must 
fairly match the exporters’ use of port services and facilities.80 
Although the Court has never applied the U.S. Shoe standard in 
the context of the Tonnage Clause,81 some experts have argued that 
 
 73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles ex-
ported from any State.”); see Jensen, supra note 59, at 705 (“Although the Supreme 
Court has recently emphasized that the Export Clause is unique and that, in general, 
the principles of other clauses should not be used to interpret it (and vice-versa), 
there is no obvious reason why that should be so—at least not on this issue.  A fee for 
services is a fee for services, regardless of the constitutional provision involved.”). 
 74. 523 U.S. 360 (1998). 
 75. See id. at 368 (“IBM plainly stated that the Export Clause’s simple, direct, un-
qualified prohibition on any taxes or duties distinguishes it from other constitutional 
limitations on governmental taxes authority.”  (citing United States v. Int’l Bus. 
Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 843, 852 (1996))). 
 76. Id. at 363. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See id. at 367. 
 79. 92 U.S. 372, 375 (1876) (holding that the stamp on exported tobacco was a us-
er fee, not a tax, and was therefore not prohibited by the Export Clause because the 
charge “bore no proportion whatever to the quantity or value of the package on 
which [the stamp] was affixed”). 
 80. Id. at 369–70. 
 81. See Jensen, supra note 59, at 706 (“The HMT failed constitutionally because 
the measure of the charge was ‘not a fair approximation of services, facilities, or ben-
efits furnished to the exporters.’  If a harbor usage fee is going to be measured by 
value, it should be measured by the benefit provided and not the goods being 
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its application is appropriate given that the circumstances for charg-
ing fees for services are sufficiently analogous.82  In other words, if the 
charge does not constitute a tax under the Export Clause because it is 
actually a user fee, the same charge would also not constitute an im-
permissible duty of tonnage.83  Here, a port authority may avoid chal-
lenge under the Tonnage Clause by tying a charge to a definable ben-
efit flowing to the user.  Importantly, there is “no requirement that 
the fee charged in return for the services rendered be an exact dollar 
for dollar scheme.”84  Rather, in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
fee a court looks to whether the fees approximate the cost of the ser-
vices.85  Under U.S. Shoe, it would follow that if a charge is a “fair[] 
match [to] the . . . use of port services and facilities,”86 then it is a user 
fee and not an impermissible duty of tonnage. 
B. The Shipping Act 
The actions of ocean carriers, ports, and marine terminal operators 
(“MTO”)87 are regulated by the Shipping Act88 as enforced by the 
 
shipped.  The same sort of analysis ought to be appropriate under the Tonnage 
Clause: Is the charge ‘a fair approximation of services, facilities, or benefits fur-
nished?’ If so, it is ipso facto a user fee and not a duty of tonnage.” (quoting United 
States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998))).  
 82. See id. at 705 (“Although the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that 
the Export Clause is unique and that, in general, the principles of other clauses 
should not be used to interpret it (and vice-versa), there is no obvious reason why 
that should be so—at least not on this issue.  A fee for services is a fee for services, 
regardless of the constitutional provision involved.”); see also supra note 81. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Captain Andy’s Sailing, Inc. v. Johns, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1175 (D. Haw. 
2001); see e.g., Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 
838 F.2d 536, 545 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 85. See Plaquemines, 838 F.2d at 545 n.8; see also Indiana Port Comm’n v. Beth-
lehem Steel Corp., 653 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding fee imposed by the 
Port Commission on all users for constructing an access road and for dredging an im-
permissible duty of tonnage because the benefits will primarily pertain to other us-
ers). 
 86. United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 370 (1998). 
 87. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 40102(14) (West 2006) (defining a “Marine Terminal Oper-
ator” as “a person engaged in the United States in the business of providing whar-
fage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal facilities in connection with a common car-
rier”).  A port authority is a marine terminal operator as defined under the Shipping 
Act because “they own and maintain the docks and other facilities that ocean com-
mon carriers use, and because they sometimes directly operate the terminals as well.” 
FED. MAR. COMM’N, http://www.fmc.gov/marine_terminal_operators/ (last visited Ju-
ly 29, 2011). 
 88. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 40101–44106 (West 2006). 
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FMC.89  Congress first enacted the Shipping Act in 1916 as a response 
to developing wartime activities in Europe90 and has since amended 
the Act on numerous occasions during the near century since its pas-
sage.91 
Currently, the Shipping Act is designed to accomplish four goals: 
1) establish a nondiscriminatory regulatory process for the common 
carriage of goods by water in the foreign commerce of the United 
States with a  minimum of government intervention and regulatory 
costs; 
2) provide an efficient and economic transportation system in the 
ocean commerce of the United States that is, insofar as possible, in 
harmony with, and responsive to, international shipping practices; 
3) encourage the development of an economically sound and effi-
cient liner fleet of vessels of the United States capable of meeting 
national security needs; and 
4) promote the growth and development of United States exports 
through competitive and efficient ocean transportation and by plac-
ing greater reliance on the marketplace.92 
The Shipping Act’s fair practice provisions, which support the first 
goal enumerated above, regulate the ability of port authorities to im-
pose and collect fees.93  In part, the Shipping Act provides that an 
MTO may not “fail to establish, observe, and enforce just and reason-
 
 89. See id.; see also 46 C.F.R. 525.1 (2010) (providing that the Code is “necessary 
to enable the [Federal Maritime] Commission to meet its responsibilities with regard 
to identifying and preventing unreasonable preference or prejudice and unjust dis-
crimination pursuant to . . . the [Shipping] Act”). 
 90. See Michael W. Lodwick, Who Governs the Ports? A Lacuna in the Law of 
Shipping Regulation, 26 LOY. L. REV. 627, 637 (1980); Harold A. Shertz, The Ship-
ping Act of 1984: A Return to Antitrust Immunity, 14 TRANSP. L.J. 153, 155 (1985).  
Amendments to the Shipping Act in 1920 provided: 
[I]t is necessary for the national defense and domestic commerce that the 
United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most 
suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its com-
merce and serve as a naval reserve or military auxiliary in time of war or na-
tional emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens 
of the United States and it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United 
States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage the main-
tenance of such a merchant marine.   
Ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C.). 
 91. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (2006) (formerly cited as 46 U.S.C.A. § 1701); Ship-
ping Act of 1916, ch. 451, 39 Stat. 728 (1916)(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 
801-42 (1982)); Shipping Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 109-304, 120 Stat. 1523; Ocean 
Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-258, 112 Stat. 1902 (1998). 
 92. 46 U.S.C.A. § 40101. 
 93. See id. §§ 41102(c), 41106. 
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able regulations and practices relating to or connected with receiving, 
handling, storing, or delivering property”94 or “give any undue or un-
reasonable preference or advantage or impose any undue or unrea-
sonable prejudice or disadvantage with respect to any person.”95  In 
determining that a rate or fee assessed by a port on a shipper or MTO 
imposes an “undue or unreasonable prejudice,” the Supreme Court 
has held that the FMC is authorized to order and enforce prohibitions 
on the assessment of unreasonable fees and to substitute a reasonable 
regulation or practice.96  These broad provisions have been the sub-
ject of significant challenges through litigation.97 
Courts generally uphold fees as valid under the Shipping Act when 
the benefits actually inuring to a user are proportionate to the 
charge.98  In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime 
Commission, the Supreme Court revised the standard for analyzing 
discriminatory claims under the Shipping Act in holding that “the 
question under [§ 41106] is not whether the [user] has received some 
substantial benefit . . . but whether the correlation of that benefit to 
the charges imposed is reasonable.”99  In other words, when the FMC 
reviews the impact of a charge on a person under Section 41106, it 
 
 94. Id. § 41102(c). 
 95. Id. § 41106(2).  The Shipping Act omits the definition of “person” as unneces-
sary, relying instead on 1 U.S.C.A. § 1, which states that in construing an act of Con-
gress  “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associa-
tions, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 
1 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2010). 
 96. See California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 584 (1944); see also In re Sto-
rage Charges Under Agreements 6205 & 6215, 2 U.S.M.C. 48, 53 (1939).  
 97. See generally Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 390 
U.S. 261, 282 (1968); Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n, 838 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. 
Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 655 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Cargill v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 530 
F.2d 1062, 1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Flanagan Shipping Corp. v. Lake Charles Har-
bor & Terminal Dist., 27 S.R.R. 1123 (F.M.C. 1997); Port of Ponce v. Puerto Rico 
Ports Auth., 25 S.R.R. 883 (F.M.C. 1990); Gulf Container Line v. Port of Houston 
Auth., 25 S.R.R. 1141 (F.M.C. 1990); Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Plaquemines Port, Har-
bor & Terminal Dist., 21 S.R.R. 219 (F.M.C. 1981); West Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. Port of 
Houston Auth., 18 S.R.R. 783 (F.M.C. 1978). 
 98. See Volkswagenwerk, 390 U.S. at 282.  The Shipping Act standard for eva-
luating a reasonable practice differs from what passes muster under the Tonnage 
Clause in that the Tonnage Clause does not evaluate proportionality, but merely ex-
amines whether the individual paying the fee is receiving a reasonable benefit in ex-
change.  See Plaquemines, 838 F.2d at 545 n.8 (“[T]he slight divergence between the 
class that benefits and the class that pays seems of no significance under the rationale 
of Clyde Mallory.  No ship is charged without receiving a benefit.” (referencing Clyde 
Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 (1935))).   
 99. 390 U.S. at 282. 
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must determine “whether the charge levied is reasonably related to 
the service rendered.”100 
Applying the Volkswagenwerk test, courts have undertaken a de-
tailed analysis of the costs and benefits associated with a particular 
fee.  In Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Federal Maritime 
Commission,101 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reversed the FMC’s determination that a fee imposed by an 
MTO on stevedores for the use of a grain elevator was a reasonable 
practice under the Shipping Act.102  The MTO charged the stevedores 
five cents for each ton of grain loaded or unloaded by the MTO and 
charged the same amount to shippers for the same service.103  In ren-
dering its decision, the court relied heavily on a report issued by the 
FMC finding that 
[s]tevedores do not benefit from the speed and efficiency of the 
shipping gallery to the same extent as does either the cargo or the 
vessel. . . .  [T]he cargo benefits by incurring lower loading expenses.  
The vessel benefits by having to spend fewer days in port for loading 
operations, thus allowing it to transport more shiploads over a 
shorter period of time.  But no such benefit can be equated to steve-
dores.  In fact, it can be argued that the speed and efficiency of the 
shipping gallery works to the detriment of stevedores, providing 
shorter working hours by fewer men and therefore less revenues to 
the stevedores.104 
The court explained that “if the challenger pays more than other 
parties pay, for fewer benefits than other parties receive, then the 
charge is unreasonable under [the Shipping Act].”105  This type of 
granular analysis has been common among courts and the FMC when 
reviewing challenges under the Shipping Act.106 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. 655 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 1211. 
 104. Id. at 1212 (quoting from Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Cargill, 
Inc., 18 F.M.C. 140, 161 (1975)). 
 105. Id. at 1217. 
 106. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 390 U.S. 261, 
282 (1968); Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 
F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, 655 F.2d at 1217; Cargill 
v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 530 F.2d 1062, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Flanagan Shipping 
Corp. v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 27 S.R.R. 1123 (F.M.C. 1997); Port 
of Ponce v. Puerto Rico Ports Auth., 25 S.R.R. 883 (F.M.C. 1990); Gulf Container 
Line v. Port of Houston Auth., 25 S.R.R. 1141 (F.M.C. 1990); Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. 
Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 21 S.R.R. 219 (F.M.C. 1981); West Gulf 
Mar. Ass’n v. Port of Houston Auth., 18 S.R.R. 783 (F.M.C. 1978). 
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Courts have struck down fees as invalid under the Shipping Act 
when imposed on a user for services that it did not practically re-
ceive107 and for optional services that the shipper chose to perform it-
self.108  The Shipping Act has also been held to preclude a port from 
assessing fees disproportionately for services that affect users based 
on geography,109 the type of cargo carried,110 or the size or ownership 
of the vessel.111  In short, courts’ primary concern is that MTOs ap-
portion the charges and the benefits as closely as possible.112 
C. Plaquemines: Courts’ Exacting Standard Under the Shipping 
Act 
Both the Tonnage Clause and the Shipping Act preclude the as-
sessment of a charge that does not reasonably correlate to the bene-
fits conferred on the user.  Courts have, however, interpreted the rea-
sonableness of the correlation differently under the two laws.  This 
distinction is aptly illustrated in Plaquemines Port, Harbor and Ter-
minal District v. Federal Maritime Commission, where the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court held that the challenged assessment passed constitutional 
muster under the Tonnage Clause, but failed the comparative analysis 
test under the Shipping Act. 113 
In Plaquemines, the Port levied a “harbor fee” on “all commercial 
cargo vessels which dock, moor, or anchor”114 for various emergency 
services and related equipment.115  The Port, however, carved out cer-
tain exceptions for “commercial fishing vessels, crew boats, and 
supply boats for oil rigs,”116 as well as “all privately owned commer-
 
 107. See Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, 655 F.2d at 1215 (stating that the port’s 
analysis did not demonstrate how stevedores received a benefit from an automated 
shipping gallery); Flanagan Shipping, 27 S.R.R. at 1131–32 (stating that benefits that 
merely promoted efficiency in the shipping business as a whole but could not be tied 
to the user charged were not reasonable). 
 108. See Gulf Container Line, 25 S.R.R. at 1147 (holding that the port was unrea-
sonable in insisting that a vessel must avail itself of additional services such as refrige-
ration monitoring). 
 109. See Port of Ponce, 25 S.R.R. at 890 (stating that uniform charge is unreasona-
ble if benefit level is substantially different between two ports). 
 110. See Volkswagenwerk, 390 U.S. at 281. 
 111. See Plaquemines, 838 F.2d at 548 (holding fee unreasonable where nonpaying 
small vessels and private terminals receive fire and emergency benefits provided by 
port authority, which are paid for with charges assessed on larger vessels). 
 112. See id. at 548 n.11. 
 113. Id. at 536. 
 114. Id. at 541. 
 115. See id. at 540. 
 116. Id. at 541. 
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cial wharves and docks.”117  Like Clyde Mallory Lines v. Port of Ala-
bama, the court upheld the charge under the Tonnage Clause because 
“[a]ll vessels whether or not they catch fire or need rescue services, 
benefit from their availability.”118  The court found that such services 
were particularly important in light of the high traffic surrounding the 
Plaquemines Port.119  The Port argued that imposing the fee on small-
er vessels created an administrative burden, which justified the prac-
tice of subsidizing the services for smaller ships from the fees imposed 
on the larger vessels.120  The court, however, refused to uphold the 
FMC’s determination that the charge was reasonable under the Ship-
ping Act.121  Applying the Volkswagenwerk standard, the court rea-
soned that where parties exempt from a charge are deriving a signifi-
cant benefit from the emergency services, the charge violates the 
Shipping Act.122 
Although the distinction is not clearly stated, the court does pro-
vide some illustration in the footnotes of the case.  The court noted 
that, under the Tonnage Clause, “the slight divergence between the 
class that benefits and the class that pays seems of no significance un-
der the rationale of Clyde Mallory.  No ship is charged without re-
ceiving a benefit.”123  In other words, the nexus between the charge 
and the services rendered was close enough for the court to view the 
charge as a user fee, rather than a tax.  The Shipping Act, however, 
precluded the charge on grounds that a significant number of ships 
receive the full benefit of the service without paying the fee.124  
Therefore, a fee that is not a tax may still be invalidated under a 
court’s more exacting standard under the Shipping Act. 
II.  ADDRESSING THE FUNDING PROBLEM 
There is minimal dispute over the need for investment in port-
related infrastructure and development.125  Instead, the debate focus-
es on how to best generate new funding mechanisms for this invest-
ment.126  The shipping industry has voiced two primary concerns: (1) 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 545. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See id. at 548. 
 121. See id. at 546–48. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 545 n.8 (emphasis added). 
 124. See id. at 548 n.11. 
 125. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, supra note 8. 
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who will absorb short-term costs127 and (2) which regulatory authority 
will administrate the funding mechanism—federal, state, or local?128 
As to the first concern, regardless of whether port users incur im-
mediate costs associated with general infrastructure and development 
fees, costs will ultimately pass through to the consumer.  In Baton 
Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission, the 
court noted: 
One can make the economic argument that there is no difference in 
the long run whether the cost of the grain elevator is charged to the 
stevedore rather than the vessel, because the charges will be passed 
on to the party, usually the vessel, employing the stevedore to load 
and trim the vessel.  In the long run, the stevedore’s charge will be 
borne by the ultimate beneficiary of the services, the consumer, re-
gardless of whether the stevedore is employed by and paid in the 
first instance by the vessel or shipper.  But at least in the short run, 
different consequences will attach to differences in the immediate 
incidence of the charges.129 
Industry actors could argue that, regardless of whether the con-
sumer will ultimately shoulder rising costs, short-term costs may be 
sufficiently onerous to price out struggling Port Users—particularly 
in a protracted economic recession.130  Further, short-term costs tied 
to charges assessed by port authorities are subject to the Shipping 
Act’s prohibition on unreasonable or discriminatory practices.131  The 
problem with these arguments is that strict deregulatory measures 
have adversely affected Port Users by impeding modernization of 
new infrastructure and development.132 
 
 127. See id. (quoting Anne Kappel, vice president of the World Shipping Council, 
as stating, “It is difficult to accept the concept of user fee if all users aren’t paying.”). 
 128. See id. (“[T]he debate now centers on how to structure [user fees] and wheth-
er a national fee is preferable to a series of state and local fees.”). 
 129. 655 F.2d 1210, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Cargill v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 530 
F.2d 1062, 1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). 
 130. See Leach, Blocking that Diversion, supra note 17 (“[L]ast year, the port [of 
New York and New Jersey] handled 3.6 million loaded 20-foot equivalent unit con-
tainers, down 12 percent from 4.1 million loaded TEUs of imports and exports in 
2008.”); Jones Lang LaSalle, supra note 16, at 7 (“Between 2007 and 2009, the na-
tion’s top 13 ports witnessed an 18.5 percent decline in total throughput as both do-
mestic and international consumption waned.”). 
 131. See Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 
F.2d 536, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 132. See Bill Mongelluzzo, Shippers More Accepting of User Fees, J. COM., Oct. 
17, 2007, at WP (“Importers and exporters support an aggressive program to expand 
the nation’s freight transportation infrastructure, and they realize that this effort may 
result in paying user fees to help fund roadway and bridge projects.”); cf. Mongelluz-
zo, New View on Fees, supra note 8 (“For years, the freight transportation industry’s 
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As to the second concern, industry actors want assurance that new 
fees will provide equivalent benefits, without additional onerous ad-
ministrative requirements.133  A federal authority may be best 
equipped to ensure a uniform administration; however, members of 
Congress have in the past raised significant funds for port-related 
maintenance and development and subsequently failed to disburse 
them.134  As one example, Congress created the Harbor Maintenance 
Trust Fund (“HMTF”) for the purposes of generating revenues for 
harbor dredging projects.135  In the last six years the HMTF has ac-
cumulated a surplus in excess of $5 billion.  Meanwhile, many harbor 
deepening projects have stalled without funding.136  Local port au-
thorities, alternatively, compete for the business of MTOs and ship-
pers who process and transport discretionary cargo (i.e., goods that 
are unloaded from ships and transported to locations more than 260 
miles from the port).137  In a market with high elasticity, such as with 
discretionary cargo, the business flows to the most efficient bidder.138  
 
attitude toward user fees designed to fund infrastructure projects was one of denial.  
Shippers and carriers hoped that if they ignored user fee proposals, they would just 
go away.”). 
 133. See Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, supra note 8; Mongelluzzo, Fees, Fees 
and More Fees, supra note 52. 
 134. See infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2236–2238 
(West 2010). 
 136. See JOHN FRITTELLI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HARBOR MAINTENANCE 
TRUST FUND EXPENDITURES (2011); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
FEDERAL USER FEES—SUBSTANTIVE REVIEWS NEEDED TO ALIGN PORT-RELATED 
FEES WITH THE PROGRAMS THEY SUPPORT 5–6 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-321 (last visited July 29, 2011) [hereinafter 
FEDERAL USER FEES]. 
 137. See Wayne K. Talley, Ocean Container Shipping: Impacts of a Technological 
Improvement, 34 J. ECON. ISSUES 933, 940 (2000) (“Port competition has intensified 
under containerization, i.e., intensified in attracting and retaining shipping lines. The 
lines put pressure on ports to reduce the time and cost of ship calls; if they do not, 
ships might call at a rival port.”).  About twenty percent of the containers moved 
through New York harbor are categorized as discretionary. See Leach, Blocking that 
Diversion, supra note 17.  Discretionary cargo can also be in the form of vehicles that 
must be processed before transportation to a point of distribution or sale. 
 138. See Leach, Blocking that Diversion, supra note 17 (“The ports of Baltimore 
and Virginia hunger for the cargo that moves through the Ports of New York and 
New Jersey to and from points beyond the densely populated region around the East 
Coast’s biggest port . . . .  An estimated 20 percent of the containers that move 
through New York harbor is categorized as discretionary . . . .”); Bill Mongelluzzo, 
Are Shipper Decisions Elastic?, J. COM., Oct. 4, 2010, at WP [hereinafter Mongelluz-
zo, Are Shipper Decisions Elastic?] (quoting Professor Robert Leachman as saying, 
“[A]t some point, the business response is to change networks by pushing goods 
elsewhere.  Where that tipping point comes—how much a supply chain will stretch to 
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Greater volumes of discretionary cargo result in more jobs, taxes, and 
growth in infrastructure—meaning that ports have an incentive to 
minimize charges.139  Additionally, shippers and MTOs are stake-
holders in port operations.  Dialogue and responsiveness between lo-
cal and industry actors would likely result in reinvestments in those 
areas most beneficial to users paying the fee.  Both of these factors 
would contribute to a reduction in transaction costs and place control 
over the allocation of funds in the hands of those who are most in-
vested in the region’s critical revenue enhancing projects—local au-
thorities.140 
Shipping industry concerns will not dictate the administration of 
new funding mechanisms, but they do provide a helpful lens through 
which to analyze the costs and benefits associated with certain policy 
decisions.  This Part discusses the various schemes by which Congress 
and port authorities have sought to generate new funding sources, de-
spite economic downturns141 and constitutional and statutory restric-
tions.142 
A. Congressional Proposals 
Congressional representatives have introduced several bills de-
signed to generate funding for investment in infrastructure at U.S. 
seaports.  These bills rely primarily on the constitutionally delegated 
power to tax and spend.143  Tax and spend measures, however, are li-
mited by the Constitution’s Export Clause, which categorically bars 
Congress from imposing a tax on exports.144  Alternatively, user fees 
 
accommodate new costs before it breaks and is rebuilt elsewhere—is a question pub-
lic policy planners, shippers and carriers are trying to understand.”); Mongelluzzo, 
Fees, Fees and More Fees, supra note 52 (“As the cost of shipping through LA-Long 
Beach increases, there are indications that some discretionary cargo is already being 
diverted to other ports—the ports’ import volumes last year were flat.  However, an 
inability by the ports to provide sufficient road, rail and terminal infrastructure would 
cause even more diversion.”). 
 139. See generally Leach, Blocking that Diversion, supra note 17; Mongelluzzo, 
Are Shipper Decisions Elastic?, supra note 138. 
 140. See generally Leach, Blocking that Diversion, supra note 17; Mongelluzzo, 
Are Shipper Decisions Elastic?, supra note 138. 
 141. See supra note 130. 
 142. See supra Part I. 
 143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and 
Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.”). 
 144. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 4; see also supra notes 73–80 and accompanying 
text. 
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assessed on Port Users may capitalize on both imports and exports, 
thus allowing for a more effective revenue generating mechanism for 
reinvestment in infrastructure and development. 
1. H.R. 526: ON TIME Act 
On February 8, 2011, Congressional Representative Ken Calvert 
(R-Cal.) reintroduced145 the Our Nation’s Trade, Infrastructure, Mo-
bility, and Efficiency Act (“ON TIME Act”),146 which would establish 
National Trade Gateway Corridors (“NTGC”) at 300 different points 
of entry, including seaports, airports, and border crossings.147  The bill 
provides for the assessment of a fee equal to 0.075% ad valorem of 
each good transported through an NTGC, or $500—whichever is 
less.148  The fees collected would be used to establish a NTGC Fund, 
which would be dedicated for use in carrying out eligible transporta-
tion projects in trade corridors within a 300-mile radius around the 
collection site.149  The bill defines an eligible project as “a project for 
construction of or improvements to a publicly owned intermodal 
freight transfer facility, for providing access to such a facility, or for 
making operational improvements to such a facility.”150  The U.S. 
Secretary of Transportation would be responsible for approving 
project eligibility and disbursing funds to the department of transpor-
tation of the state where the project would take place.151  The ON 
TIME Act would allow funds disbursed to state departments of 
transportation to remain available for six years from the last day of 
the fiscal year when funds were appropriated.152  Finally, the bill 
could provide eligible projects with up to eighty percent of required 
funding.153 
 
 145. Rep. Calvert also introduced the ON TIME Act in the 110th Congress (H.R. 
5102) and in the 111th Congress (H.R. 947). 
 146. See H.R. 526, 112th Cong. (2011); Calvert Reintroduces Goods Movement 
Bill, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Feb. 8, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://blogs.pe.com/politics/2011/02/ 
calvert-reintroduces-goods-mov.html. 
 147. See H.R. 526 §§ 3(a), (b). 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. § 7(b). 
 150. Id. § 10(1)(B). 
 151. Id. § 4(b). 
 152. Id. § 4(b)(3). 
 153. Id. § 6(d)(1).  
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It is important to note that this bill purportedly imposes a fee on 
exports.154  Presumably, the argument could be made that the 300-
mile geographic restriction on spending ensures that the benefits of 
the charge would be enjoyed by or, at the very least, available to the 
payor.155  The nexus between the charge and the services provided 
would likely be of significant debate.  If a court deemed the fee a tax 
under U.S. Shoe,156 the fee would be an unconstitutional violation of 
the Export Clause.157  This bill straddles the line between what consti-
tutes a tax and a user fee. 
2. H.R. 2355: MOVEMENT Act of 2009 
Congresswoman Laura Richardson (D-Cal.) in 2009 reintroduced 
the Making Opportunities Via Efficient and More Effective National 
Transportation Act (“MOVEMENT Act”),158 which creates a Na-
tional Goods Movement Improvement Fund (“NGMIF”) for use with 
eligible improvement projects, environmental projects, and homeland 
security projects.159  Unlike the ON TIME Act, this bill imposes a tax 
on the value of commercial cargo entering a U.S. seaport.160  The bill 
directs the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to pre-approve projects 
eligible for funding161 and distribute funds to state departments of 
transportation for investment.162  Further, the bill imposes a forty-
mile district around the collection site for eligible project construc-
tion,163 which is nearly one-eighth the size of the area encompassed in 
the ON TIME Act.164  Also, the MOVEMENT Act reallocates 
 
 154. See Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, supra note 8 (“The Calvert bill . . . re-
quire[s] that the money be spent within 300 miles of where it’s collected.  This would 
establish the charge as a user fee rather than a tax . . . .”). 
 155. See United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998); see also supra 
notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
 157. See U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. at 370. 
 158. H.R. 2355, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 159. See id. § 201.  The bill breaks down funding allocations that limit the amount 
of funds ports can allocate to homeland security projects (three percent) and envi-
ronmental projects (seven percent). Id. § 103(d)(2). 
 160. See id. § 202(a) (amending Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 4461).  The 
ON TIME Act states that the charge is a fee rather than a tax and does not include 
any amendment to the Internal Revenue Tax Code. See generally H.R. 526, 112th 
Cong. (2011).  
 161. H.R. 2355 § 103(c)(3). 
 162. Id. § 103(c)(1). 
 163. Id. § 103(e).  
 164. Cf. H.R. 526, 112th Cong. § 7(b)(2).  Neither H.R. 526 nor H.R. 2355 provide 
any justification for the prescribed geographic boundaries.  A critical reader, howev-
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71.43% of the funds held in the HMTF165 to the NGMIF.166  Finally, 
the bill provides a federal grant share of up to ninety percent of eligi-
ble project cost with a possible waiver for states of up to twenty per-
cent of grant share if certain conditions are met.167 
One particular problem with this bill is that its revenue generating 
potential is constrained by the Export Clause,168 which exempts all 
exported goods from taxation.  Additionally, this bill creates a second 
fund for infrastructure-related projects that overlaps with the existing 
HMTF.169 
3. H.R. 2707: National Freight Mobility Infrastructure Fund 
In 2009, Representative Adam Smith (D-Wash.) introduced H.R. 
2707 to raise funds for reinvestment in the freight network, including 
both highways and railways, through a national competitive grant 
program managed by the U.S. Department of Transportation.170  This 
bill creates a funding mechanism by amending the Internal Revenue 
Code to impose a tax on ground transportation equal to one percent 
of the fair market value of the cost of transporting the property.171  
“Taxable ground transportation” is transportation of property by 
freight rail or commercial motor vehicle.172  Revenues collected are 
then deposited into a National Freight Mobility Infrastructure Fund, 
which are dedicated for use with eligible projects.  Eligible projects 
include, among others, 
expansion of rail and highway tunnels to accommodate larger, taller, 
and additional volumes of vehicular and rail freight and container 
 
er, could reason that the bills are designed to take into account intermodal facilities 
that may be located interior to the State of California, such as the Alamaeda Corri-
dor. 
 165. Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 2236–2238 (West 
2010); see infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text (stating that the Harbor Main-
tenance Trust Fund—a Congressional fund dedicated for channel dredging and other 
harbor maintenance activities—has accrued a surplus of more than $5 billion due to 
annual revenue collections totaling more than $1.4 billion and disbursements averag-
ing less than $800 million during the 2005 to 2009 period). 
 166. H.R. 2355 § 201(a).  This reallocation suggests that the funds from the 
NGMIF would also be allocated to accommodate qualifying dredging projects. 
 167. See id. § 104(f). 
 168. See United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 370 (1998).  
 169. See infra notes 178–181 and accompanying text (explaining that congressional 
inaction has resulted in the HMTF having a $5 billion surplus, while the busiest har-
bors need maintenance funding).  
 170. H.R. 2707, 111th Cong. § 102 (2009). 
 171. Id. § 202(a). 
 172. Id. 
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stacks; the addition of railroad track and intermodal facilities at in-
ternational gateways . . . and sea ports . . . and highway and road 
construction . . . at international gateways and sea ports.173 
H.R. 2707 limits grants to eighty percent of the project cost, which 
would require a local contribution.174  The bill does, however, provide 
that a proposer may qualify for a full-funding grant agreement.175 
4. Congressional Analysis 
Two long-term problems with the bills discussed above are that the 
Export Clause limits the revenue generating potential of congression-
al tax and spend measures176 and that the bills only partially fund qua-
lifying projects.177  A broader fee assessed on all cargo—not just im-
ports—would generate revenues more quickly and best provide fund-
funding in full for capital-intensive infrastructure and development 
projects. 
A third problem with a congressional solution is that the distribu-
tion of funds would be contingent on congressional action.  The 
HMTF is one example of how the members of Congress can create a 
fund to meet an existing need and subsequently fail to allocate funds 
to needy projects.  The HMTF is funded with tax revenues assessed 
on the value of imported goods, which Congress may use for the 
dredging and maintenance of waterways and channels.178  “In recent 
years, HMTF annual expenditures have remained relatively flat while 
[Harbor Maintenance Tax] collections have increased due to rising 
import volume . . . .  Consequently, a large ‘surplus’ in the HMTF has 
developed.  Despite the surplus, the busiest U.S. harbors are not be-
ing fully maintained . . . .”179  This surplus has engendered debate over 
whether members of Congress are adequately responsive to the needs 
of ports180 and has even prompted Senator Carl Levin to sponsor the 
 
 173. H.R. 2707 §§ 104(a)(3)(D)–(F).  
 174. Id. § 106(c).  
 175. Id. § 201(c).  
 176. See supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text. 
 177. The ON TIME Act limits funding to eighty percent of project cost, H.R. 526, 
112th Cong. § 6(d).  The MOVEMENT Act of 2009 limited funding to ninety percent 
of project cost, H.R. 2355, 111th Cong. § 104(f).  The National Freight Mobility Infra-
structure Fund limited funding to eighty percent of project cost, H.R. 2707, 111th 
Cong. § 106(c). 
 178. FRITTELLI, supra note 136; see also FEDERAL USER FEES, supra note 136, at 
5–6. 
 179. Id. 
 180. S. 412, 112th Cong. (2011); AM. ASSOC. OF PORT AUTH., HARBOR MAINTEN-
ANCE TAX (Mar. 2010), http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/Harbor%20Maintenance 
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Harbor Maintenance Act of 2011 to guarantee that funds collected 
are disbursed for necessary projects.181 
The short-term problem with these bills is that they must be passed 
and implemented.  The proposed solutions are complex and produce 
significant bureaucratic hurdles with respect to their implementation. 
For example, the ON TIME Act requires establishing 300 separate 
collection points at different border locations before the collection of 
funds can begin.182  Further, the ON TIME Act, the MOVEMENT 
Act of 2009, and the National Freight Mobility Infrastructure Fund 
provide for a broad range of road, freight rail, airport, and seaport-
related projects.183  Agreeing upon and administrating a broad range 
of eligible projects could create an administrative backlog and hinder 
timely congressional action.  As discussed below, local authorities 
could administrate a more efficient and sustainable solution. 
B. National Infrastructure Bank 
President Obama resurrected the discussion of a National Infra-
structure Bank during a 2010 Labor Day speech184 and in his calls for 
increased infrastructure investment during the 2011 State of the Un-
ion Address.185  On March 15, 2011, Senators John Kerry and Kay 
 
%20Tax%202010.pdf (stating that a surplus of more than $5 billion exists in the Har-
bor Maintenance Trust Fund with annual revenue of more than $1.4 billion and dis-
bursements averaging less than $800 million from the 2005 to 2009 period); Eric Ku-
lich, Rep. Mica Urges Action on HMT Bill, AM. SHIPPER (May 28, 2010), http://www. 
americanshipper.com/NewWeb/News/shippers-newswire/ports-terminals/159510--
rep-mica-urges-action-on-hmt-bill.html; Wayne K. Talley, Financing Port Dredging 
Costs: Taxes vs. User Fees, TRANSP. J., Summer 2007, at 53. 
 181. The Harbor Maintenance Act of 2011 would require Congress to appropriate 
funds for eligible projects in an amount equal to the receipts for the respective fiscal 
year.  See S. 412 § 2(a)(1). 
 182. H.R. 526, 112th Cong. §§ 3(a), (b) (2011). 
 183. See supra Part II.A.1–3. 
 184. See Editorial, One Jobs Idea from Obama that Should Fly, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 7, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-
view/2010/0907/One-jobs-idea-from-Obama-that-should-fly (quoting President Ob-
ama as saying, “reforming the haphazard and patchwork way we fund and maintain 
our infrastructure to focus less on wasteful earmarks and outdated formulas and 
more on competition and innovation that gives us the best bang for the buck.”).  This 
concept was originally introduced by Senator Dodd and former Senator Hagel as the 
National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007. S. 1926, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 185. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
supra note 7, at 19; EVERETT EHRLICH, A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BANK: A 
ROAD GUIDE TO A DESTINATION 1 (2010), available at http://www.progressivefix. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/09.2010-Ehrlich_A-National-Infrastructure-
Bank.pdf.  
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Bailey Hutchison introduced the Building and Upgrading Infrastruc-
ture for Long-term Development (“BUILD”) Act.186  The BUILD 
Act creates an American Infrastructure Financing Authority (“AI-
FA”), a type of infrastructure bank, to help “facilitate investment in, 
and long-term financing of, economically viable infrastructure 
projects of regional or national significance . . . .”187  An eligible 
project could include roads, bridges, rail, water systems, or power gr-
ids.188  The BUILD Act provides for an initial government investment 
of $10 billion189 that could “leverage up to $600 billion in private in-
vestments to repair, modernize, and expand . . . [the United States’] 
ailing infrastructure system.”190  The AIFA’s Board of Directors 
would be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the funding of 
eligible projects.191  In meeting eligibility requirements, projects must 
have a minimum estimated cost of $100 million; however, qualifying 
projects in rural areas would need to demonstrate costs equal to or 
greater than $25 million.192 
Setting a lower cost threshold for rural areas is an improvement 
over a previous infrastructure bank proposal,193 which would have al-
located funds only for projects with an estimated cost equal to or 
greater than $75 million.194  In the context of addressing the current 
infrastructure and development crisis specific to U.S. ports, however, 
 
 186. S. 652, 112th Cong. (2011); see Press Release, John Kerry, U.S. Chamber, 
AFL-CIO Urge Infrastructure Bank (Mar. 15, 2011), http://kerry.senate.gov/ 
press/release/?id=c53e83c0-b95d-4e2d-9816-d5726d2b0d6c; see also S. 1926, 110th 
Cong. (2009); Michael Cooper, Group Wants New Bank to Finance Infrastructure, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2011, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/16/us/politics/16infrastructure.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss (noting that 
the infrastructure bank advocated for by President Obama would only fund transpor-
tation-related projects, whereas the BUILD Act would also finance water systems 
and power grids). 
 187. S. 652 § 2(b). 
 188. See Cooper, supra note 186. 
 189. See S. 652 § 303. 
 190. Press Release, John Kerry, supra note 187 (quoting the Chief Executive Of-
ficer of the AFL-CIO, Thomas J. Donahue).   
 191. See S. 652 § 104. 
 192. See id. § 201(d). 
 193. See S. 1926, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 194. Id. § 202(b); Daniel Indiviglio, Would a National Infrastructure Bank Help?, 
ATLANTIC, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/09/ 
would-a-national-infrastructure-bank-help/63052/ (stating that smaller and less po-
pulous states would fight the creation of the infrastructure bank because funding 
would be distributed according to determined importance of the project, and less po-
pulous areas would be at a clear disadvantage); cf. Felix G. Rohatyn, The Case for an 
Infrastructure Bank, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2010, at A17.  
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the BUILD Act presents two potential issues: (1) establishing a func-
tional infrastructure bank could take a significant amount of time, 
and (2) the scope of project eligibility is very broad.  A more targeted 
and expedited funding mechanism could be achieved through the as-
sessment of cargo-based fees, which would be collected and rein-
vested by local authorities.195 
C. Structured User Fees 
The Volkswagenwerk comparative analysis standard requires that 
the charges imposed by a port authority on a user of the port be rea-
sonably proportionate to the benefits generated by the charge.196  
Port authorities have implemented several targeted fee structures in 
connection with providing twenty-four-hour terminal access, added 
security measures, and subsidies for new trucks entering port facili-
ties.  This Section examines each of these three fee structures and 
analyzes whether each fee would withstand a challenge under the 
Tonnage Clause and Shipping Act.197 
1. PierPASS 
In February 2004, California Assemblyman Alan Lowenthal intro-
duced a bill into the General Assembly that would impose a fee on 
any truck entering the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles from 
8:00 AM to 5:00 PM, Monday through Friday, for the purpose of 
transporting cargo.198  The bill was intended to reduce congestion in 
the ports associated with increasing trade volumes and, in turn, com-
bat the adverse environmental and public health-related effects at-
tendant with increased truck emissions.199  MTOs in both ports 
strongly opposed the bill, particularly because a governmental au-
thority would manage and control the fee revenue.200  Recognizing 
that the health and safety concerns were driving legislators toward 
 
 195. See infra Part III. 
 196. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra Part I. 
 198. See A.B. 2041, 2003–04 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).  A.B. 2041 was 
not passed into law, but did ultimately lead to the creation of the PierPASS system. 
 199. Trucks transporting cargo run on diesel fuel, which, when burned, generates 
greater levels of particulate than passenger automobiles running on unleaded gaso-
line. See supra note 19.  Congestion on roadways results in increased truck idling 
time, which then results in less efficient fuel usage and increased emissions.   
 200. See Freight Mgmt. & Operations, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://ops.fhwa.dot. 
gov/publications/fhwahop09014/sect2.htm (last visited July 29, 2011). 
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passing the bill, MTOs decided to form a privately managed corpora-
tion to achieve the intent and purpose of the proposed legislation.201 
In 2005, PierPASS was created.202  “PierPASS is a not-for-profit 
company created by marine terminal operators at the ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach to address multi-terminal issues such as 
congestion, security and air quality.”203  PierPASS charges beneficial 
cargo owners fifty dollars per TEU204 for most cargo moved during 
peak hours.205  The fees collected by PierPASS are then used to oper-
ate and maintain points of entry during off-peak hours.206  There is no 
charge for off-peak hour access.207  By 2006, PierPASS shifted to off-
peak hours forty percent of the containers transported by truck 
through the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.208 
PierPASS would withstand challenge under the Tonnage Clause 
because it is assessed on the beneficial cargo owner, rather than a 
shipper entering, remaining in, or departing from a port.209  The fee 
would also likely be upheld as a reasonable practice under the Ship-
ping Act because each user receives a tangible benefit, and the fee as-
sessed is a fair match to the benefit enjoyed by the user.210  First, any 
truck paying the fee is granted peak-hour gate access.211  Second, the 
fee paid by beneficial cargo owners for peak-hour entry funds twenty-
four-hour gate access at the ports.212  This benefit structure, in turn, 
incentivizes truckers to utilize off-peak hour access, which reduces 
peak-hour congestion, results in quicker peak-hour cargo pick-up and 
delivery, and reduces fuel consumption.  Thus, the fifty-dollar charge 
 
 201. See id.  Although private MTOs created PierPASS, the analysis under the 
Shipping Act is the same regardless of whether the entity imposing the fee is public 
or private. 
 202. PIERPASS, http://pierpass.org/about/ (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Bill Mongelluzzo, LA-LB to Keep PierPass Rates, J. COM., Aug. 4, 2009, at 
WP, available at http://www.joc.com/maritime/la-lb-keep-pierpass-rates.  
 205. See id.  Peak hours are designated as Monday through Friday, 3:00 AM to 
6:00 PM. PIERPASS, supra note 202. 
 206. PIERPASS, supra note 202. 
 207. Id.  
 208. See Peter Tirschwell, A Mixed Picture, J. COM., Mar. 13, 2006, at 54. 
 209. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 267 (1935); Packet Co. v. 
Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 85–87 (1877); Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. 577, 582 (1874); 
Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 F.2d 536, 545 
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Captain Andy’s Sailing, Inc. v. Johns, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1172 (D. 
Haw. 2001). 
 210. See supra Part I.A., I.C. 
 211. PIERPASS, supra note 202. 
 212. See id. 
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assessed on the beneficial cargo owner for peak-hour gate access is 
accompanied by a reasonably proportionate benefit.213 
The PierPASS fee structure starkly contrasts with those fees struck 
down as unreasonable under the Shipping Act in Baton Rouge214 and 
Plaquemines.215  In Baton Rouge, the court found invalid a marine 
terminal operator’s charge on stevedores for the use of equipment 
that had the ultimate effect of reducing the need for services supplied 
by stevedores.216  In Plaquemines, the court invalidated a charge on 
large ships that was used to subsidize the cost of emergency services 
for an entire class of nonpaying smaller ships.217  In both Baton 
Rouge and Plaquemines, the definable benefit was found to be dis-
proportionate to the charge assessed on the individual enjoying that 
benefit.218  Alternatively, PierPASS’s fee structure ensures that the 
benefits of peak-hour access are proportionate to the charge assessed 
on those who choose to incur it, irrespective of whether twenty-four-
hour gate access provides benefits to truckers enjoying off-peak 
access. 
The PierPASS system operates fairly smoothly within the frame-
work of the Shipping Act; however, the comparative costs and bene-
fits of security-related fees are more difficult to reason. 
2. Security-Related Fees 
A host of port authorities assess an approximate six-dollar 
charge219 on all containers unloaded from a ship at the port to offset 
the cost of federally mandated security measures.220  The surcharge is 
generally invoiced to the shipper221 and is used to fund various securi-
ty measures, such as port-wide radio and emergency notification sys-
 
 213. See supra notes 101–06.  
 214. See supra Part I.B. 
 215. See supra Part I.C. 
 216. Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 655 F.2d 1210, 
1217 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  
 217. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 F.2d 
536, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 218. See id.; Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, 655 F.2d at 1217. 
 219. See generally AM. ASSOC. OF PORT AUTH., SECURITY FEES AND SURCHARGES 
AT U.S. PORTS 34 (2008), available at http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/Statistics/ 
USPortSecurityFeesAndSurcharges.pdf.   
 220. See id. at 2; see, e.g., Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107–295, 116 Stat. 2064; see also FRITTELLI, supra note 136. 
 221. AM. ASSOC. OF PORT. AUTH., supra note 219, at 7. 
COOK_CHRISTENSEN 1/30/2012  10:14 AM 
2011]FUNDING PORT-RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE1555 
tems, port-wide cameras and surveillance systems, and security im-
provements to roadways and other common areas, among others.222 
The fees would almost certainly withstand challenge under the 
Tonnage Clause because definable benefits inure to shippers paying 
the charge, regardless of whether all users of the port avail themselves 
of the services.  Similar to the fees for general emergency services in 
Clyde Mallory and Plaquemines, all users of the port avail themselves 
of port-related security measures.  Therefore, the fee is not likely an 
impermissible duty of tonnage. 
The Shipping Act analysis of security-related fees is more akin to 
the Plaquemines case.223  Security-related fees are assessed on all 
loaded containers.224  Those opposing such a charge could argue that 
the fee is discriminatory because cargo also enters the port secured in 
boxes, crates, drums, or barrels.  Arguably, shippers of these goods 
enjoy the same security benefits funded through assessments on the 
shippers of containerized cargo.  In form and substance, the security 
fee closely resembles the fee for emergency services shouldered by 
large ships in Plaquemines, which was struck down as invalid under 
the Shipping Act.225  Port authorities defending the fee, however, 
could argue that containerized trade comprises a highly disproportio-
nate share of all cargo entering the port relative to bulk and break-
bulk cargo.  Therefore, the failure to assess the charge on marginal 
cargo volumes results in a de minimis discriminatory effect.226 
Security-related fees assessed on a per-container basis is not a per-
fect fit within the framework of the Shipping Act; however, the high 
value associated with port security could be viewed as reasonably 
proportional to the approximate six dollar per-container charge.  The 
arguably proportional measure of benefits to costs could dissuade 
 
 222. See 46 U.S.C.A. § 70107 (2010).  In response to the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation Security Act (“MTSA”).  It 
requires ports to develop Area Marine Transportation Security Plans, which involve 
the implementation of “security monitoring and recording, security gates and fencing, 
marine barriers for designated security zones, security-related lighting systems, re-
mote surveillance, concealed video systems, security vessels, and other security-
related infrastructure or equipment that contributes to the overall security of passen-
gers, cargo, or crewmembers.” Id. 
 223. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 F.2d 
536, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 224. AM. ASSOC. OF PORT AUTH., supra note 219, at 2.   
 225. 838 F.2d at 548. 
 226. See id. (stating that the FMC’s determination that excluding a marginal group 
of small boats from a fee structure acted as a reasonable de minimis exception). 
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shippers from risking additional cost associated with litigating wheth-
er the fee is unreasonable or discriminatory under the Shipping Act.   
The nexus between costs and actual benefits flowing to a user be-
come even more attenuated in a system designed to reduce adverse 
environmental and public health effects. 
3. Clean Truck Program 
The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach implemented the Clean 
Truck Program as an environmental initiative designed to phase out 
the use of older and less efficient trucks, while subsidizing the pur-
chase of newer and cleaner models.227  Together the ports established 
a timeline for phasing out the use of pre-2007 model trucks in the 
transportation of goods at the ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach.228 
The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach created a not-for-profit 
organization known as PortCheck to collect and manage the Clean 
Trucks Fee.229  Fees are used to subsidize the purchase of 2007 or 
newer model trucks.230  The fee is charged on beneficial cargo owners 
and consists of a thirty-five dollar per-loaded-TEU charge on trucks 
manufactured between 1994 and 2006.231  The Clean Truck Program 
is scheduled to sunset in 2012, when all trucks have been replaced by 
 
 227. See Port of Los Angeles, Tariff No. 4, Section 20, Item No. 2035 (Dec. 17, 
2009), available at www.portoflosangeles.org/Tariff/SEC20.pdf; see Bill Mongelluzzo, 
The Coming Storm: Port Trucking in South California Will Undergo Big Changes 
During the Next Several Months, J. COM., Jan. 28, 2008, at 12 [hereinafter Mongel-
luzzo, The Coming Storm]. 
 228. On October 1, 2008, all pre-1989 trucks were banned, and on January 1, 2010, 
trucks manufactured between 1989 and 1993 were banned.  Trucks with engine model 
years 2004 and newer will continue to have access until January 1, 2012, at which 
time, trucks that do not meet the 2007 federal clean truck emissions standard will be 
banned from port terminals. See About the Port of Los Angeles Clean Truck Pro-
gram, PORT OF LOS ANGELES, http://www.portoflosangeles.org/ctp/idx_ctp.asp (last 
visited July 29, 2011). 
 229. See PORTCHECK, http://www.portcheck.org/ (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 230. PORT OF LOS ANGELES, THE PORT OF LOS ANGELES CLEAN TRUCK PRO-
GRAM: PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND BENEFITS (2008), available at http://www.port 
oflosangeles.org/ctp/CTP_O&B.pdf (last visited July 29, 2011) [hereinafter PORT OF 
LOS ANGELES CLEAN TRUCK PROGRAM]; see Mongelluzzo, The Coming Storm, su-
pra note 227. 
 231. See PORT OF LOS ANGELES CLEAN TRUCK PROGRAM, supra note 230. 
COOK_CHRISTENSEN 1/30/2012  10:14 AM 
2011]FUNDING PORT-RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE1557 
2007 or newer models.232  Unlike PierPASS, the Clean Truck Fee will 
be charged only on domestic cargo.233 
This program met considerable resistance from the trucking indus-
try, but was not challenged as an unreasonable or discriminatory 
practice under the Shipping Act.234  An analysis under the Shipping 
Act, however, is instructive.  Although the Clean Truck Fee is narrow 
in the sense that it is assessed only on beneficial cargo owners for the 
transportation of domestic cargo by truck,235 the benefits accruing 
from the collection of those fees do not appear to be reasonably pro-
portioned.236  First, the fee is collected to subsidize the purchase of 
newer and less polluting trucks.237  This benefit arguably provides a 
greater benefit to truck owners and truck drivers than to the benefi-
cial cargo owner.238  Second, the purpose for subsidizing the new 
trucks is to combat the adverse environmental impacts associated 
with older model diesel engines.239  This benefit accrues to the general 
public, including the class of individuals paying the Clean Truck Fee.  
The general benefits tied directly to the fee are akin to the invalid 
charge for emergency services subsidized by larger ships in Plaque-
mines.240  Regardless of whether the beneficial cargo owner is a mem-
ber of the public enjoying this benefit, under Volkswagenwerk, the 
fee and benefit must be closely apportioned.241  Here, classes of non-
paying individuals seem to be benefitting as much, if not more, than 
 
 232. See id. 
 233. For example, mainland trade destined for Hawaii, Guam, or Alaska would be 
charged a fee. See id. 
 234. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, CV 08-4920, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 88134 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 2011 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 19609 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2011) (defendants claiming that Clean Truck Pro-
gram was a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and void under Federal 
Preemption doctrine); see also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 
08-4920, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118949 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction for employee driver provision and denying injunctive relief for off-
street parking provision).  It is still undetermined whether the Clean Truck Program 
will ultimately withstand challenge; but claims were likely not brought under the 
Shipping Act for strategic reasons, such as possible concern over the creation of un-
desirable precedent and a greater likelihood of success under a different legal theory. 
 235. See PORT OF LOS ANGELES CLEAN TRUCK PROGRAM, supra note 230. 
 236. See supra notes 73–86 and accompanying text. 
 237. See PORT OF LOS ANGELES CLEAN TRUCK PROGRAM, supra note 230. 
 238. See COALITION FOR HEALTHY PORTS, supra note 19. 
 239. See PORT OF LOS ANGELES CLEAN TRUCK PROGRAM, supra note 230. 
 240. See supra Part I.C. 
 241. See supra Part I.B. 
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those paying the fee.  Therefore, on its face, such a fee appears to be a 
violation of the Shipping Act. 
Although not challenged under the Shipping Act, the Clean Truck 
Fee is an example of how the Volkswagenwerk comparative analysis 
would likely preclude ports from undertaking initiatives where the ac-
tual benefits flowing to a user are difficult to define.  Similar difficul-
ties are encountered in the assessment of a cargo-based fee, where 
benefits accrue disproportionately to users paying and not paying the 
charge.242 
D. Port Authority Cargo-Based Fees 
Despite the exacting analysis applied by courts in a challenge under 
the Shipping Act, the United States’ three largest port authorities 
have proposed or implemented a cargo-based fee for general port im-
provements.  The Infrastructure Fee proposed by the ports of Los 
Angeles and Long Beach is not scheduled to become effective until 
January 2012.243  The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s 
(“PANYNJ”) Cargo Facility Charge was implemented in March 
2011,244 and in May 2011 invoices assessing the charge were issued to 
MTOs.245  Shipping lines acted quickly.  On August 5, 2011, nine 
shipping lines filed suit against PANYNJ before the FMC alleging 
that the Cargo Facility Charge is a violation of the Shipping Act’s 
prohibition on unreasonable and discriminatory practices.246  Al-
though no determination has been made as to whether the charges 
and benefits associated with the Cargo Facility Charge are sufficiently 
apportioned, the litigation illustrates the costs and challenges to port 
authorities associated with funding port-related infrastructure and 
development.  This section will first outline the structure and purpose 
behind each fee, and then analyze their validity under the Shipping 
Act and Tonnage Clause.247 
 
 242. See infra Part II.D, III. 
 243. Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 45. 
 244. Section H, Subrule 34, supra note 45. 
 245. Id.  
 246. See Complaint for Cease and Desist Order and Reparations, supra note 49.  
Plaintiff shipping lines allege that enforcement of the Cargo Facility charge is an “un-
lawful exaction of fees not commensurate with services provided,” and that “the 
threat of expulsion from all Port facilities, impose[s] unreasonable, undue and unlaw-
ful detriment, prejudice and harm” in violation of the Shipping Act.  Id. at V; 46 
U.S.C.A. §§ 41102(c), 41106 (West 2006); see infra Part II.D.2–3; see also supra note 
287 (discussing the significance of this litigation to the proposal outlined in this 
Note). 
 247. See supra Part I. 
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1. Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach—Infrastructure Fee 
The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach first proposed a per-
container user fee for implementation in 2008;248 however, implemen-
tation of the fee is now estimated to become effective on January 1, 
2012.249  The Infrastructure Fee would be assessed on beneficial cargo 
owners for each TEU that enters or leaves the ports of Los Angeles 
or Long Beach.250  The fee would vary between ten and eighteen dol-
lars per TEU over a five-year period and is estimated to raise $1.4 bil-
lion,251 which would fund a portion of costs for trade-related infra-
structure and emission-reduction projects.252  The State of California 
would contribute the balance of the estimated $2.9 billion cost for the 
specified port-area infrastructure projects.253  The fee would not apply 
to environmental review processes, but would cover a portion of the 
costs for the later stages of projects, including final design, utility re-
location, right-of-way acquisition, construction, and construction 
management.254  Finally, the tariff provides that the Infrastructure 
Fee would cease to be collected  
(a) after the share of Approved Infrastructure Project costs alloca-
ble to be recovered by the Port Infrastructure Fund have been paid 
in full; (b) after the Executive Directors determine that the Infra-
structure Fund balance is sufficient to pay all such costs; or (c) if the 
Clean Truck Fee cannot be collected . . . whichever occurs first.255 
 
 248. Bill Mongelluzzo, LA-LB Lay Up Infrastructure Fee, J. COM., Aug. 4, 2009, 
http://www.joc.com/maritime/la-lb-lay-infrastructure-fee (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 249. Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 45.  The Ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach have stated that the delay is due to poor economic conditions and fears that 
the industry actors may redirect their business to other ports in reducing transaction 
costs. See Art Marroquin, Harbor Commissioners Delay Decision on Cargo Fee, 
ALLBUSINESS, Mar. 5, 2010, http://www.allbusiness.com/economy-economic-
indicators/economic-conditions-decline/14052467-1.html (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 250. Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 45. 
 251. See PORT OF LOS ANGELES, Q&A: INFRASTRUCTURE CARGO FEE 2–3 (2010), 
available at www.portoflosangeles.org/CAAP/ICF_Tariff_QA.pdf (last visited July 
29, 2011). 
 252. The listed projects include the Gerald Desmond Bridge Replacement; the SR-
47 Expressway; Navy Way/Seaside Avenue Interchange; South Wilmington Grade 
Separation; I-110 Connectors Program; and Ports rail systems to facilitate use of on-
dock rail. See Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 45, at Item No. 2100. 
 253. See supra note 252. 
 254. Id.  
 255. Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 45, at Item No. 2105. 
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2. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey—Cargo Facility 
Charge 
Effective March 14, 2011, PANYNJ amended its tariff, FMC Sche-
dule No. PA 10 (the “Tariff”), to include a charge equal to $4.95 per 
TEU, $1.11 per vehicle, and $0.13 per metric ton on bulk, which “shall 
apply to all cargo containers, vehicles and bulk cargo, break-bulk car-
go, general cargo, heavy lift cargo, and other special cargo discharged 
from or loaded onto vessels at PANYNJ leased and public berths.”256  
PANYNJ is a landlord port authority, meaning that it leases land to 
private MTOs who then contract with ocean carriers for the delivery 
of goods.257  The Cargo Facility Charge provides that shippers are re-
sponsible for payment, but requires MTOs to collect the fee and remit 
payment to PANYNJ.258  If a shipper does not pay the Cargo Facility 
Charge for two consecutive billing periods, the Tariff provides that 
the shipper must be denied service by all MTOs in the ports of New 
York and New Jersey.259  If an MTO continues to provide service to a 
shipper that should be denied service pursuant to Section H of the ta-
riff, then that MTO becomes fully liable to PANYNJ indefinitely for 
the Cargo Facility Charges assessed on the shipper.260  The single 
Cargo Facility Charge replaces a previous fee for port rail facility use 
and will finance several major roadways used to transport cargo to 
and from marine terminals as well as “a number of operational and 
physical security improvements at the marine terminal facilities.”261  
 
 256. Section H, Subrule 34, supra note 45; see PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., CARGO 
FACILITY CHARGE: THE PATH TO PROVIDING A MORE EFFICIENT, SAFE, AND ENVI-
RONMENTALLY FRIENDLY TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM (2010), available at 
http://www.pakair.net/upload/Cargo-Facility_New%20York-%20New%20Jersey_ 
presentation.pdf.  The Port Authority’s jurisdiction is statutorily limited to a “Port 
District,” which is defined geographically as an approximate twenty-five mile radius 
around the Statue of Liberty.  N.J.S.A. 32: 1-3 (2006); Overview of Facilities and Ser-
vices, PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., http://www.panynj.gov/about/ 
facilities-services.html (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 257. See ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES AT THE PORT OF NEW YORK AND NEW JER-
SEY, http://www.panynj.gov/about/port-initiatives.html (last visited July 29, 2011). 
 258. Section H, Subrule 34, supra note 45. 
 259. Id. at Subrule 34-1220(3)(b)(iii).  
 260. Id. at Subrule 34-1220(3)(b)(iv). 
 261. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Board Minutes, Port of New York and New Jer-
sey—Establishment of Cargo Facility Charge—Elimination of Sea Link Container 
Terminals Subscription  Fee—Amendment of Agreements with Millennium Marine 
Rail, LLC, New York Container Terminal, Inc., and Port Newark Container Termin-
al, LLC 356 (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.panynj.gov/corporate-information/pdf/ 
board_minutes_dec_7_2010.pdf; see also Peter T. Leach, NY-NJ Port to Spend $65 
Million on Terminal Road, J. COM., Dec. 8, 2010, at WP (“The road upgrades, which 
COOK_CHRISTENSEN 1/30/2012  10:14 AM 
2011]FUNDING PORT-RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE1561 
These expansions will be undertaken to reduce congestion and travel 
time, accommodate future volume growth, decrease truck idling time, 
and enhance security and safety in the ports of New York and New 
Jersey.262  “The fee is projected to generate $26 million a year.”263 
3. Analysis of Cargo-Based Fee Validity 
Identifying the benefits from the Infrastructure Fee and the Cargo 
Facility Charge is critical in assessing the validity of the fee under the 
Tonnage Clause and Shipping Act.  Equally important is recognizing 
who is actually enjoying those benefits.  Under the Shipping Act, the 
reasonableness of the fee will need to be closely apportioned to the 
benefits actually enjoyed.264  The Tonnage Clause commands a less 
exacting standard—that the fees are tied to an actual use enjoyed by 
the payor.265 
The Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach’s Infrastructure 
Fee is assessed directly on beneficial cargo owners transporting con-
tainerized cargo.266  The fees would be used to construct, repair, main-
tain, and operate various highway and freight rail projects designed to 
reduce roadway congestion and adverse environmental and public 
health-related impacts.267  These benefits flow directly to beneficial 
cargo owners.  For example, the savings attendant with reduced fuel 
consumption and quicker delivery and pick-up times would be passed 
through to the beneficial cargo owner in the form of reduced transac-
tion costs.268  What the Infrastructure Fee fails to address is the free 
ride given to trucks transporting vehicle, bulk, and break-bulk cargo, 
as well as every motorist traveling on the funded improvement.269  A 
 
are designed to ease traffic congestion, increase cargo capacity and enhance safety, 
will be financed by a new infrastructure fee on all cargo . . . .”). 
 262. See Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Board Minutes, supra note 261. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 390 U.S. 261, 282 
(1968). 
 265. See United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360 (1998); Clyde Mallory 
Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 266–67 (1935). 
 266. See cases cited supra note 265. 
 267. Id.  
 268. See Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 655 F.2d 
1210 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 269. See Mongelluzzo, Fees, Fees and More Fees, supra note 52 (“[T]rucks pulling 
empty containers or carrying bulk products will not have to pay.  Neither will the 
hundreds of motorists who drive their cars each day in the harbor area . . . .  And the 
plan will invite litigation because it raises fairness issues under the Shipping Act, and 
possibly constitutional questions if it is judged to be a tax on exports.”). 
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court is not likely to view these exceptions as de minimis.270  Further, 
the environmental benefits of the various transportation projects in-
ure to the benefit of everyone.271  Although the benefits of cleaner air 
and reduced fuel consumption could be seen as ancillary to the con-
struction and maintenance of new and existing freight rail and road-
ways, the Shipping Act provides that the actual benefits flowing to a 
user must be as closely apportioned as possible to the charge.272 
 Alternatively, PANYNJ’s Cargo Facility Charge is assessed on al-
most all shippers loading or unloading cargo at the port.273  Like the 
Infrastructure Fee, fees collected under the Cargo Facility Charge will 
be used to construct, repair, maintain, and operate roadway and 
freight rail projects.274  New roadways and freight rail facilities would 
benefit shippers utilizing those improvements by reducing time in the 
port to load and unload cargo.  The problem is that not all shippers 
avail themselves of these benefits.  Nine shipping lines assert this ar-
gument, claiming that PANYNJ’s Cargo Facility Charge unreasona-
bly prefers shippers who are largely reliant on freight rail to those 
shippers who minimally utilize freight rail, if at all.275  Further, chal-
lengers could argue that freight rail and roadway improvements inure 
to truckers and beneficial cargo owners—who do not pay the Cargo 
Facility Charge—in greater proportion than to shippers.  This fee 
structure was specifically struck down in the Baton Rouge decision, 
which held that “if the challenger pays more than other parties pay, 
for fewer benefits than other parties receive, then the charge is unrea-
sonable under [the Shipping Act].”276 
All three ports will likely have a difficult time defending a chal-
lenge to cargo-based charge under the Shipping Act.  With a sophisti-
 
 270. See Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 
F.2d 536, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 271. Environmental benefits are significantly broader than the fire and emergency 
benefits discussed in Plaquemines. See id. 
 272. See generally Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, 655 F.2d 1210 (stating port’s 
analysis did not demonstrate how stevedores received a benefit from an automated 
shipping gallery); Flanagan Shipping Corp. v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 
27 S.R.R. 1123 (F.M.C. 1997) (stating benefits that merely promoted efficiency in the 
shipping business as a whole but could not be tied to the user charged were not rea-
sonable).  
 273. Section H, Subrule 34, supra note 45; cf. Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 
45. 
 274. See sources cited supra note 273. 
 275. See Complaint for Cease and Desist Order and Reparations, supra note 49, at 
IV(cc); see also infra note 287 (discussing the significance of this litigation to the pro-
posal outlined in this Note). 
 276. Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, 655 F.2d at 1217. 
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cated economic analysis, however, the ports could demonstrate that 
the reduced congestion and development of intermodal facilities ac-
crues a tangible benefit on shippers and beneficial-cargo owners in 
proportion to the cost by reducing the overall cost of transporting 
goods through more efficient loading, unloading, and delivery 
times.277  Additionally, if the short-term costs of the Infrastructure 
Fee and Cargo Facility Charge were immediately absorbed into the 
price of shipping services, it could be argued that the costs attendant 
with the fee would actually be borne by the consumer and were thus 
de minimis.278 
Finally, the Infrastructure Fee and Cargo Facility Charge would 
not likely constitute a tax under the Tonnage Clause.  Both fees, at 
least in part, fund the repair, maintenance, and operation of existing 
freight rail and roadway projects.279  Under Clyde Mallory, these fees 
would be justified on grounds that the use of these projects confers a 
measurable benefit on the payor in the form of reduced time for load-
ing and unloading and, consequently, less fuel consumption in the 
ports.  Even under U.S. Shoe, one could argue convincingly that the 
fees—approximately $4.95 per TEU under the Cargo Facility Charge 
and $10 per TEU under the Infrastructure Fee—are a “fair[] match 
[to] the . . . use of port services and facilities”280 and, therefore, are 
not an impermissible duty of tonnage.281 
The cargo-based fees proposed or implemented at the three largest 
U.S. ports generate revenue for reinvestment in port-related infra-
structure and development projects.  Both fees likely withstand chal-
lenge under the Tonnage Clause, but their sustainability is uncertain 
under the Shipping Act.282  Given the need to generate new funding 
for infrastructure and development at U.S. seaports, Congress should 
expressly authorize port authorities to assess fees on Port Users for 
 
 277. See generally Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Board Minutes, supra note 261 (“In 
addition to those who directly utilize the rail system, given the long-standing issues of 
road congestion in the Port, those who ship by truck have benefited from the invest-
ment in the [rail] system and continue to do so.  Accordingly, it is fair and appropri-
ate that they share in the cost of the investment in the [rail] system.”). See also 
sources cited supra note 273. 
 278. See Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 838 
F.2d 536, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 279. Cf. Tariff No. 4, Section 21, supra note 45. See generally Section H, Subrule 
34, supra note 45.   
 280. United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 370 (1998). 
 281. See supra Part II.A. 
 282. See generally Complaint for Cease and Desist Order and Reparations, supra 
note 49. 
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reinvestment in port-related improvements by amending the Shipping 
Act. 
III.  PROPOSED REFORM 
Port authorities have not openly considered the imposition of a 
cargo-based fee on Port Users since 2008.283  Prior to March 2011, no 
port authority had implemented this type of fee structure to fund 
port-related infrastructure and development projects.284  The FMC 
has followed the instruction and guidance provided by courts in ana-
lyzing whether particular fees are permissible under the Shipping 
Act.285  Given that the cargo-based fees as proposed or implemented 
by the three largest U.S. container ports do not have the express con-
sent of Congress, they are vulnerable to challenge under the Shipping 
Act and Tonnage Clause.286  In fact, on August 5, 2011, nine shipping 
lines challenged PANYNJ’s Cargo Facility Charge as a violation of 
the Shipping Act’s prohibition on unreasonable and discriminatory 
practices.287 
As discussed above, federal, state, and industry actors agree that 
investments in infrastructure and development are critical to the fu-
ture competitive position of the United States.288  The concerns ex-
pressed by stakeholders can best be mitigated through an amendment 
to the Shipping Act expressly providing port authorities with the 
power to assess cargo-based fees on Port Users for qualifying trans-
 
 283. Cf. Mongelluzzo, LA-LB Lay Up Infrastructure Fee, supra note 248. 
 284. Section H, Subrule 34, supra note 45. 
 285. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 390 U.S. 
261, 282 (1968); Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 
838 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Baton Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n, 655 F.2d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Cargill v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 530 F.2d 1062, 
1068–69 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
 286. See Complaint for Cease and Desist Order and Reparations, supra note 49, at 
V; supra Part I.B, II.D.2. 
 287. See Complaint for Cease and Desist Order and Reparations, supra note 49, at 
V.  This litigation holds little significance for the proposal outlined in this Note.  
While the litigation could result in the FMC or a court upholding the Cargo Facility 
Charge as valid under the Shipping Act, the opposite result is just as, if not more, 
likely.  Further, the litigation may end in settlement or be dismissed on grounds other 
than the merits of the claim.  Congressional action would eliminate ongoing and fu-
ture litigation over the validity of cargo-based fees under the Shipping Act.  The cost 
savings accruing to port authorities from reduced litigation—both in terms of mone-
tary and human capital—could instead be allocated to rebuild port-related infrastruc-
ture. 
 288. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
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portation projects, environmental initiatives, and port security meas-
ures.289 
Under this amendment, fees would be assessed and collected di-
rectly by port authorities and may be assessed on any individual in the 
supply chain (i.e., shipper, trucker, marine terminal operator, or 
beneficial cargo owner) at the discretion of the port authority.290  This 
amendment would allow port authorities broad power to incorporate 
fees into their current business model in a flexible and seamless man-
ner. 
Port authorities would only be authorized to invest in infrastruc-
ture projects that have been approved by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation.291  Project eligibility would be determined by criteria 
designed to measure the project’s effectiveness in meeting current 
and future capacity, security, and environmental needs.  Factors such 
as geographic location, population density, and accessibility to high-
way and freight rail facilities should be considered.  Further, in closely 
apportioning the benefits to the charges imposed, proposed projects 
would be located within a geographic area that begins at the cargo’s 
point of origin and extends along the coast or waterway in either di-
rection for ten miles.292  Eligible projects would fall within a one-mile 
radius from that coast or waterway.  Recognizing that densely popu-
lated areas present unique concerns with respect to port-related con-
gestion and pollution, an exception to the foregoing geographic limi-
tations would be made for metropolitan areas measuring a population 
density greater than 1000 people per square mile of land.293  For ex-
 
 289. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 290. This structure would support the existing East Coast Cargo Facility Charge, 
which is assessed on the shipper but collected through the marine terminal operator, 
as well as the West Coast Infrastructure Fee, which is assessed on the beneficial cargo 
owner. See supra Part II.D. 
 291. The U.S. Department of Transportation is better suited for this task than state 
departments of transportation because there is a less likely chance that the federal 
government will use its political power to obstruct planning and construction in ex-
change for reallocations of funds collected under this provision. 
 292. Cf. ON TIME Act, H.R. 526, 112th Cong. § 7(b) (2011) (providing that funds 
may be used within a 300-mile radius of the collection site); MOVEMENT Act of 
2009, H.R. 2355, 111th Cong. § 103(e) (2009) (imposing a forty-mile district around 
the collection site for eligible project construction). 
 293. The population density would be determined by the most recent census data 
provided by the U.S. census. Cf. United States and Puerto Rico—Metropolitan Area, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-
ds_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U&-CONTEXT=gct&-mt_name=DEC_2000_SF1_U_ 
GCTPH1_US25&-redoLog=false&-_caller=geoselect&-geo_id=&-format=US-10| 
US-10S&-_lang=en.   
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ample, if a ship were to dock in New York Harbor, this amendment 
would allow PANYNJ to assess a cargo-based fee to fund the con-
struction, maintenance, and repair of a qualifying project from 
Bayonne, New Jersey to Fort Lee, New Jersey, and from parts of 
Brooklyn, New York to Hoboken, New Jersey.  Given the population 
density of the region, PANYNJ would be permitted to fund eligible 
projects outside of this initial funding zone, provided that the popula-
tion density extending from the point of origin to the project location 
was greater than 1000 people per square mile.  These restrictions 
would limit the ability of states to divert funds to non-port-related in-
frastructure projects and ensure that the benefits of the investment 
are most likely to flow to the users paying the charge.294 
The amendment would also require that all design and build plans 
be submitted and approved before the fifth-year anniversary of the 
amendment’s passage.  Charges assessed under the amendment 
would be tied to the estimated useful life of the project.  Beginning on 
the fifth-year anniversary, no new projects would be approved and, 
therefore, the charges assessed for a specific project would remain 
static throughout the useful life of the project.295 
This proposal might give pause to federal and industry actors.  
These parties would likely argue that a more uniform implementa-
tion, collection, and distribution of the fee could be achieved under 
the direction of the federal government.  This argument, however, 
fails to recognize that port authorities are local actors who can best 
determine which projects will best generate value for users and bene-
ficiaries of that particular port.296  Additionally, port authorities are in 
direct competition for discretionary cargo,297 which provides an incen-
tive to develop a fee tailored to specific projects that would best grow 
the region and cater to the needs of the shippers and cargo owners 
calling at that port.298  Port authorities and shippers alike can draw a 
lesson from the federal government’s handling of the HMTF, which 
 
 294. This scheme reflects the principles of the Shipping Act and Tonnage Clause, 
as discussed in Part I. 
 295. If project costs were to exceed estimates due to any number of reasons, the 
charge would, of course, need to be adjusted accordingly. 
 296. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text. 
 297. See Mongelluzzo, Are Shipper Decisions Elastic?, supra note 138 (“Ports, 
ocean carriers and railroads compete fiercely for market share, but most shippers 
base their decisions on how to build distribution networks and route freight on one 
very basic number: the one that tells them how much it costs to deliver the freight.”); 
supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. 
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has accrued a surplus of more than $5 billion due to annual revenue 
collections totaling more than $1.4 billion and disbursements averag-
ing less than $800 million during the 2004 to 2009 period.299  A feder-
ally regulated infrastructure fund—like those proposed in the ON 
TIME Act,300 The MOVEMENT Act of 2009,301 and the National 
Freight Mobility Infrastructure Fund302—would subject disburse-
ments to congressional approval and political posturing.303  Providing 
port authorities with the power to impose and invest fees collected 
under the amendment would best ensure responsive and efficient in-
vestment in critical port-related infrastructure projects.304 
Industry actors cannot argue that, regardless of how the charges 
are assessed, the payor would shoulder an unequal burden of the 
short-term costs.  In contrast, the amendment would reduce the 
amount of the fee that is imposed by providing adequate cost spread-
ing over the useful life of the project.  Further, short-term costs could 
be alleviated by quick adjustments in the cost of services, ultimately 
passing expenses through to the ultimate beneficiary—the consum-
er.305 
The structure of the amendment also addresses the argument that 
once enacted, the charge would be difficult if not impossible to re-
peal.  Fees would only be collected for qualifying projects, which once 
completed would no longer qualify for additional funding.  The 
amendment would ensure that projects are begun and funded in a 
timely manner by requiring port authorities to receive U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation approval on design and build plans for eligi-
ble projects before the end of the fifth year following enactment.  
Once the useful life of the project expires, maintenance and operation 
funds could then be collected directly from the users availing them-
selves of those facilities. 
 
 299. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 301. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 302. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 303. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 304. See supra notes 133–40. 
 305. For example, a forty-foot container holds approximately 600 thirty-two-inch 
flat screen televisions, which would result in an increase to the consumer of $0.015 
per television; a forty-foot container holds approximately 4000 pairs of athletic shoes, 
which would result in an increase to the consumer of $0.002 per pair; a twenty-foot 
container holds approximately 4600 six-packs of bottled beer, which would equal 
$0.001 per six-pack. See PORT AUTH. OF N.Y. & N.J., supra note 256; see also Baton 
Rouge Marine Contractors, Inc. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 655 F.2d 1210, 1212–13 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
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Finally, the proposed amendment would not preclude the ability of 
port authorities to form private-public ventures to generate funding 
and develop infrastructure.  The amendment would provide port au-
thorities with complete discretion as to whether the fees should be as-
sessed at all.306  The amendment would only provide port authorities 
with Congress’ express authority to impose fees within reasonable pa-
rameters established by the amendment and the Constitution’s Ex-
port Clause.307  In this way, port authorities could modernize the way 
goods are transported through U.S. ports with the requisite flexibility 
and authority to maximize the benefits for all stakeholders and share-
holders. 
CONCLUSION 
Significant debate has arisen over how to address the need for new 
infrastructure and development at U.S. seaports.  The proposal out-
lined in this Note is intended to address several shortcomings in the 
solutions proposed by federal and state actors; however, this proposal 
requires that federal, state, and industry actors unify their goals and 
cooperatively support a statutory amendment to the Shipping Act.  In 
this way, port authorities can work with all stakeholders to ensure 
that the costs associated with this monumental undertaking provide a 
lasting solution that generates proportionate benefits.  One express 
purpose behind the drafting of the Shipping Act is to “promote the 
growth and development of U.S. exports through competitive and ef-
ficient ocean transportation and by placing greater reliance on the 
marketplace.”  The construction, maintenance, and operation of U.S. 
seaports by port authorities is just such a market.  Allowing port au-
thorities to control the collection and reinvestment of a per-container 
cargo fee would be regulated through market forces (i.e., competition 
between ports), while facilitating economic recovery through job cre-
 
 306. This aspect of the amendment is similar to permissible user fees at airports.  
The federal Passenger Facility Charge (“PFC”) Program allows the collection of PFC 
fees up to $4.50 for every enplaned passenger at commercial airports controlled by 
public agencies. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://www.faa.gov/airports/pfc/ (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2010).  Airports use these fees to fund FAA-approved projects that 
enhance safety, security, or capacity, reduce noise; or increase air carrier competition. 
See id.  Federal law limits use of PFC funds strictly to the above categories. See id.; 
see also Mongelluzzo, New View on Fees, supra note 8 (reporting that Moffat & Ni-
chol Engineers stated that all airports have the authority to charge a fee for facility 
improvements, but they are also free not to levy the fee). 
 307. Note that the Tonnage Clause will not limit the ability of ports to assess 
charges under the amendment because Congress will have specifically consented to 
the charge. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. 
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ation, the generation of federal, state and local tax revenues, and 
global competitiveness in the fast-evolving trade in containerized car-
go. 
 
